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Abstract 
 The goal of this thesis is to examine how the government of the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea uses social control to enforce its will over its people. This 
examination will be based around social control mechanisms used in three separate areas 
of society. I referred to these three areas of social control as pillars of power. The first 
pillar of power is control over the economy and distribution of resources. The second 
pillar is control and influence over culture and the flow of information. The third pillar of 
power is the monopoly of force, both the ability to use physical violence and legitimize 
violence. To illustrate these pillars of power this report will rely on already established 
theories of anthropologists such as F.G. Bailey, Marvin Harris and James C. Scott. This 
thesis will also rely on content analysis of the written memoirs, testimony and lectures  
given by North Koreans who have escaped the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 
This thesis will also rely on content analysis of North Korean propaganda and media.  
Through the use of existing theory combined with content analysis of the accounts of 
everyday North Korean citizens this thesis will demonstrate how the three pillars of 
power work together to create a platform of power for the regime and what happens when 
       
those pillars of power begin to fall. This thesis will also examine the current situation 
within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the prospects for reunification 
with the Republic of Korea. This Thesis will prove that the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea has relied on control of these three pillars of power and that the regime's current 
tenuous situation and instability can be traced to its full or partial loss of one or more of 


















       
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 1 -REVIEW OF RELEVANT MATERIAL  ............................................................................ 6 
CHAPTER 2 - DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES AND THE ECONOMIC PILLAR OF POWER  ...... 16 
CHAPTER 3- PERCEPTION OF CONTROL – THE STATE CONTROL OF INFORMATION AND 
CULTURE AS THE SECOND PILLAR OF POWER.  ............................................................................ 29 
CHAPTER 4 - PILLAR THREE - THE MONOPOLY OF VIOLENCE. .................................................. 47 
CHAPTER 5 - THE CURRENT SITUATION NORTH KOREA AND PROSPECTS OF 
REUNIFICATION ................................................................................................................................... 58 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................ 71 






Examining the topic of what I have conceptualized as the pillars of power upon 
which a state bases its legitimacy requires a number of theoretical paradigms to be 
utilized. The works of anthropologists such as Marvin Harris, Marcel Mauss, F.G. Bailey, 
Victor Turner, James C. Scott, Benedict Anderson and Max Weber have been examined 
with consideration to game theory, cultural materialism, anthropological Marxism, 
structural functionalism and state monopoly on force in order to prepare a foundation for 
further examination of the three pillars of power and how these pillars are used in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.   
 These three methods of social control and manipulation are essential to the 
survival of the state. The best way I have found to visualize this relationship is to imagine 
a person sitting on a three legged stool. The person represents the state and each leg of 
the stool represents a method of control used by the state. When all three legs are intact, 
the state is able to sit on the stool quite easily, or maintaining legitimacy and control of 
the population is easier. If a leg is lost, this becomes more difficult, in terms of balance, 
but may still be manageable.  However, if two of legs of the stool are lost, then 
maintaining power becomes difficult and the whole regime becomes unstable. In the 
broadest terms, the three legs or pillars of power that all states rely on are as follows: 
economic and resource control, control and manipulation of information and culture, and 
the monopoly of violence as described by Max Weber. By examining the relationship 
between these three pillars of state control, we can acquire greater understanding of how 
the state functions and maintains itself, while inherently being made up of a body of 
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millions of individuals. 
 I therefore hypothesize that state level societies rely on maintaining control of 
three key aspects of their society, number one being the control of the economy and the 
resources of a state. The best way to examine social control within the format of these 
three pillars is utilizing existing political anthropological theory as a basis for support of 
this format. Examination of  the first pillar of power will utilize cultural materialism as 
outlined by Marvin Harris as well as the systems of reciprocity and patronage established 
by Marcel Mauss’s work on gift giving. The second pillar of power will use F.G. Bailey’s 
work on game theory and political arenas which will be vital to explaining how the state 
control of information helps to legitimize power. The third pillar is what sociologist Max 
Weber referred to as the Monopoly on Force. This individual theory is well established 
and focuses on the state’s ability to utilize and legitimize force and violence.   It is 
important to look at the monopoly of violence. However it is far more important to 
understand how the monopoly of violence acts in concert with the control of economics 
and control of information to create an effective base or foundation.  
 Additionally, as focus must be given to the historical context, it is only by 
understanding the state's history, as well as the history of the state’s different ethnic 
groups that one can fully understand how systems of control are instituted and effectively 
used by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It is imperative to effectively 
understand the historical context of a state, as one cannot make accurate comparisons and 
inferences to the nature of control in state level societies without the historical 
background. 
To accurately examine methods of social control and the mechanisms used by the 
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state for maintaining social control, a case study is needed. For the purpose of this paper, 
the case study and primary example used is the Democratic People's Republic of North 
Korea (DPRK).  It may also be referred to, in shortened form, as North Korea. For the 
purpose of this paper I will use the term DPRK with “North Korean” only used when 
referring to the people of the DPRK. 
 The DPRK provides an excellent example for examining social control 
mechanisms for several reasons. First and foremost is the level of direct control exercised 
by the DPRK on its population. This direct control provides a straightforward example 
for analysis and provides mechanisms of social control that are readily identified. 
Additionally, at the time of this writing, the DPRK continues to be a state of considerable 
importance in international affairs, often resulting in instability and tension in global 
events. It is therefore the intent of this paper to provide further insight into the working of 
this state. Examining what I am referring to as the the three pillars of power and viewing 
them through the lens of the DPRK will assist in providing understanding for behaviors 
of regimes which seem outside of the norm for state behaviors and identifying how states 
can move towards an environment that deviates from that which would be perceived as a 
successful environment and state. 
 It necessary to examine how economic distribution and political economy have 
played a significant role in shaping the regime's capacity for control. In examining this it 
will be necessary to include Marcel Mauss’s work on gift giving and Marvin Harris’s 
work on cultural materialism. This examination will also rely on available accounts from 
average North Korean citizens on the economic exchange in the DPRK. 
Secondly, this paper will examine the use of media and the control of the flow of 
4 
 
information into North Korea. The regime’s use and modification of traditional Korean 
culture to suit the political whims and goals of the Kim regime will also be examined. 
This will be done with the use of F.G. Bailey’s Game theory as well as examining regime 
propaganda and its similarity to traditional Korean myths and history. 
 The third point that will be presented is the state monopoly on violence. This is 
not just about having control over a military force, but also includes the ability to 
legitimize violence. The concept of the monopoly of violence was first articulated by 
sociologist Max Weber. This paper will examine how the use of the monopoly of 
violence can vary and how, depending on the situation, the use of violent authority can 
achieve the desired outcome, or result in unforeseen consequences.  
 Finally, this is paper will examine how these three pillars work in concert to assist 
a state in maintaining legitimacy and control over its population. Additional information 
will be provided as to how control can waiver as a state loses different structures of 
control. For this section of the paper, the primary focus will be on North Korea as a case 
study for state level social control.  The goal of this work is to establish a clear 
understanding of structures and concepts at work within the DPRK to ensure state 
control.  
State level societies are large social structures that can encompass a single cultural 
group or multiple cultural groups of different sizes. The creation of these structures has 
by no means taken a single process. All state level societies are centralized political 
entities controlled through bureaucracy with the authority to use force as a means of 
maintaining power.  While each state is different and must be understood within the 
context of the culture or cultures that created it, all state level societies share some 
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common mechanisms.  Institutions that serve the function of maintaining legitimacy and 
the state in the eyes of the populace therefore maintain a level of control over their 
populations. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has been chosen for the case 
study for this thesis because it provides a clearer example of each of these structures due 


















Chapter 1 -Review of Relevant Material 
Politics has been a subject of interest within anthropology since the discipline’s 
inception. Even the earliest works of anthropologists, such as Lewis H. Morgan and Sir 
Henry Maine, could be argued to have political tendencies as they attempted to create a 
continuum and trace the evolution of human society from the 'primitive' or 'savage' to the 
modern state level society. Although these early writings were heavily ensconced with 
ethnocentrism and a sense of colonial superiority, they nevertheless contributed to 
clarifying information related to human society. Political systems and governance are a 
part of any human society.  The focus of this thesis is on the state level society of the 
DPRK.  This chapter focuses on examining the anthropological theories that contribute to 
understanding state level societies. However, earlier theories and political anthropology 
that relate to tribal or non-state level societies remain essential to this examination as 
quite often they will form the basis for theoretical paradigms used to examine state level 
societies. 
 The first pillar of political power within the state level society is economic 
stability and control, or influence.  Economic anthropological theory is of paramount 
importance to political anthropology. The ability to influence or directly control the 
distribution of resources among a community of people can bring enormous political 
power. One of the most important theories with regard to economic anthropology is that 
of cultural materialism theorized by Marvin Harris.  
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Cultural materialism was first described by Marvin Harris in The Rise of 
Anthropological Theory. Harris argued that there were three components to cultural 
materialism, the first being the infrastructure followed by the structure and the third being 
the superstructure. The infrastructure refers to the key elements of society, the basic 
requirements that are needed to keep society together. The infrastructure refers to 
society’s basic needs for survival such as food production and shelter. The structure 
refers to how society chooses to organize itself, such as systems of kinship, government, 
and methods of exchange. Finally, the superstructure is what we might call high culture, 
the arts, religion, recreation and stylistic architecture. (Harris 2001:53). Harris 
characterizes the infrastructure, structure and superstructure as components of the 
building. With the infrastructure providing the base and core for society, the structure 
providing in its general shape and organization and the superstructure being the final 
finishing touch that gives the building great distinction. 
These concepts of cultural materialism are of particular importance in Harris’s 
study of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As a country with a similar economic system 
as well a tight control on communication and culture, the Soviet Union is a case study 
with many similar structural institutions as the DPRK. In a 1992 lecture Harris’ described 
the basic failure of Soviet infrastructure to provide Soviet citizens with basic resources 
such as food, clothing and energy (Harris 1992:298). While the focus of Harris analysis is 
on the economic and cultural materialist perspective for the collapse, he acknowledges 
that the collapse of the Soviet Union was not simply due to the collapse of the 
infrastructure and that other factors did contribute to dissolution of the Soviet Union 
(Harris 1992: 300). 
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  The exchange of gifts, goods or of services is an important part of political 
economy. These transactions not only involve exchanging of physical objects between 
two parties but can also represent an exchange of obligation or prestige between two 
parties. Anthropologist Marcel Mauss contended that all gift exchanges are in fact given 
with the expectation of reciprocation of the gift in one form or another in his 1925 short 
publication entitled Forme et Raison de L'échange dans les Sociétés Archaïques or An 
Essay on the Gift: the Form and Reason of Exchange in Archaic Societies. Mauss argued 
that all societies from the most complex to the most basic contained some form of market 
exchange and that market exchange was a phenomenon known to every human society 
(Mauss 1967: 2). "This work is part of the wider research carried out by Davey and 
myself upon archaic forms of contract, so we may start by summarizing what we have 
found so far. It appears that there has never existed, either in the past or in modern 
primitive societies, anything like a 'natural' economy. German economists have invented 
the term Naturalwirtschaft, natural economy, to describe the period prior to the invention 
of money. "(Pirenne 1936: 103). One of the important distinctions noted by Mauss in the 
system of economic exchange is that when speaking of the natural economy existing he 
was not referring to how individuals conducted business between one another, but rather 
how groups conducted business between each other. "For it is groups and not individuals, 
which carry on exchange, make contracts, and are bound by obligations; the persons 
represented in the contracts are moral persons – clans, tribes, and families: the groups, or 
chiefs as intermediaries for the groups, confront and oppose each other." (Mauss 1967: 
2). Within a state level society this approach to gift giving helps to reinforce the idea of 
the group over the individual and reinforce social norms.  Within the DPRK gift giving 
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acts in a similar fashion, acting as a kind of second economy outside the state distribution 
system. Providing a legal way for individual citizens to gain power and clout 
economically and politically. 
Another theory of great importance within political anthropology is that of F.G. 
Bailey’s ‘game theory’. This theory was initially expounded in F.G. Bailey’s 1969 book, 
Stratagems and Spoils.   Game theory takes the approach that all political processes are 
governed by a set of rules and that all political combatants are obliged to follow these 
rules. These rules may be conscious, or subconscious, with political combatants not even 
aware that they are following the rules. Game theory divides these rules into two separate 
categories, normative rules and pragmatic rules. (Bailey 2004: 15) 
 Normative rules consist of conscious rules of which all political combatants are 
aware, or publicly profess. (Bailey 2004: 22) Within North Korea, the normative rules, or 
codes of conduct can be seen in professing devotion to the Kim family, shunning the 
trappings of capitalism and personal wealth, and professing a desire for self-reliance 
under the Juche philosophy.  
The pragmatic rules are not formalized rules and are not publicly attested to by 
the political combatants. Nevertheless, these unspoken rules are important and play into 
any political fight for power. In many ways, the pragmatic rules are far more important to 
gaining political power than the normative rules (Bailey 2004: 14) Within the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea, we can often see this through maintaining correct personal 
relationships, or even in how central party leadership has been purged by Kim Jong-Un 
since taking over power from his father. Though the officials may have proven their 
loyalty to his father and the party as a whole, they do not owe their position within the 
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regime to Kim Jong-Un directly, and therefore purging them and replacing them with 
new officials who will owe their assent to him is an example of a pragmatic rule. 
 An additional component of Bailey’s game theory is its focus on the different 
types of political and power-based coalitions that can develop. Bailey refers to these as 
political teams.  Political teams can be divided into two basic arenas, contract teams and 
moral teams.  
Contract teams are, as the name indicates, united by a common interest, or mutual 
benefit, and involved in contractually established relationships. These coalitions are 
derived from common goals among their members. While these can be powerful 
coalitions, they may not last once the members have achieved their individual political 
objectives (Bailey 2004: 28). 
Moral teams are comprised of individuals that derive unity from shared identity, 
such as a shared ethnic, ideological, or religious identity. These teams tend to have 
loyalty instilled in them, as they are united by something more concrete than mutual 
benefit. While these different teams may refer to two entirely different makeups, there 
can be a mixture of both contract team members and moral team members in the same 
political camp. People may be drawn to a leader as a moral team member, whereas others 
could be drawn to that leader as a contract team member (Bailey 2004: 28). 
Another aspect of game theory alluded to by the Manchester school of 
anthropology and anthropologist Max Glickman, is the idea of ‘maximization of power’, 
particularly through the idea of the economic man and the political man. This idea was 
emphasized by Victor Turner in his 1957 work, Schism and Continuity in African Society.  
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This work established the idea that there are different spheres of power and that one will 
not necessarily bring the same benefit(s) as the other. The economic man monopolizes 
economic power resources, distribution of resources and control of people or influence 
over people through an amassing of economic power. By contrast, the political man 
emphasizes power interpersonal relationships and charisma. The political man does not 
seek to monopolize or gain further control over resources but rather looks to utilize his 
own charismatic power to gain influence over individuals and use those personal 
networks as a means of establishing his power. The concept of the political arena appears 
when you have two or more of these actors competing in the same society for the same 
power (Turner 1996: 290,320).  For example, if two or more political men are attempting 
to gain power over the same society, they would create a political arena. Many of these 
theories came from Turner's work in Rhodesia, among the Ndembu.  
 One of the most important anthropological contributions to the study of state level 
societies comes from anthropologist James C. Scott and his 1985 work Weapons of the 
Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. Many of Scott's initial ideas about 
oppression and colonialism have been compared to early 20th century philosopher 
Antonio Gramsci.  In particular, Scott's ideas on hegemony have been a contentious point 
of comparison. Scott has resisted this comparison, stating that in his work, looking at 
cultural hegemony, he has never indicated that subordinate groups consent to rule by a 
hegemonic group. Much of Scott's work was conducted in peasant villages in Malaysia, 
particularly looking at post-colonial society. During his fieldwork there he examined the 
different ways that peasant groups actively attempt to resist the hegemonic power 
structure, the state. In his work Weapons of the Weak, Scott examines how communities 
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of peasants operate outside the dominant post-colonial, state level system. In particular, 
he notes that the peasants, in general, prefer a patron-client relationship of wealthier 
peasants assisting in redistributing wealth to the less fortunate peasants, rather than the 
official originations and welfare structures established by the state (Scott 1989: 34).  
Given the black market system that has taken over much of commerce in the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, one can readily draw comparisons to this 
observation by Scott. Another of Scott's influential works is his 1998 work Seeing like a 
State. In this book, Scott examines several key instances of state mandated programs, or 
actions which have been undertaken for the benefit of society.  The work reflects on how 
these endeavors have failed to achieve their stated goals.  
Scott's work on peasant resistance has been criticized for being applied too 
broadly.  Indeed, one can contend that all peasant populations, or any social class 
population, does not behave exactly the same. That however does not diminish the 
behavioral observations made by Scott, nor does it remove the applicability drawn from 
comparative inferences to other cultures. While one should always incorporate the 
individual history and cultural traits into any anthropological work before making a 
comparative inference to another culture, it does not mean that comparative inference is 
of no value. Scott's work on peasant resistance assists in providing a basis for 
anthropological understanding of resistance and deviance related to groups within state 
level societies, and goes deeper than Max Weber's idea of the state monopoly on force. 
 Much of Scott's work, in particular his focus on the Malaysian peasants, does 
have some similarities with the Manchester School of anthropology. The similarities rest 
within the idea of a case study and the fact that a case study can be applied to other 
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cultures. Much of the development of the Manchester School of anthropology can be 
credited to Max Gluckman, a British social anthropologist. The concept of case studies 
came from Gluckman's early training as a lawyer. While the Manchester School of 
anthropology reflected many of the problems which British social anthropology has been 
criticized for, such as its tendency to exclude historical context, the use of detailed 
analysis of social interaction, as well as the idea of making cross-cultural inferences were 
and remain a positive paradigm for anthropology and political anthropology. Much of the 
work conducted by the Manchester School of anthropology tended to center around 
conflict resolution and smaller societies’ class conflicts, as well as conflicts between an 
individual and a larger social structure, such as the state. 
 Benedict Anderson's 1982 publication Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism is one of the most important works in 
anthropologically understanding the modern nation state. While many nation states are 
formed along ethnic lines based on traceable cultural communities, just as many are 
artificially created entities which have either been shaped by chance or outside forces. 
The modern nation state of India is actually a compilation of many ethnic groups and 
formerly independent political entities which were amalgamated into a single governance 
by British colonialism (Anderson 1983: 36). Additionally, this artificiality occurs when 
one nation state absorbs portions of another ethnic group into its political sphere of 
influence. This example is particularly valid with regard to the border between the DPRK 
and the People's Republic of China, as much of the northwestern region of China, along 
the North Korean border, is ethnically Korean. This work also examines the importance 
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of artificially created state cultures which is of obvious importance when examining the 
case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the cult of Kim. 
 The Marxist approach to political anthropology focused on the work of authors 
such as Morton Fried. As with most Marxist theory, much of Marxian political 
anthropology focuses on the imbalance of power and the oppression of the masses by the 
bourgeoisie. Essentially, power is held by a few key players and is enforced upon the 
disenfranchised masses without power and multiple mechanisms of control are used keep 
the powerless in check. While the centralization of power and a gap in power between the 
masses and the bourgeoisie is certainly important, Marxists tend to overemphasize the 
importance of this and tend to underplay the power held by the masses. This is one of the 
key criticisms that Scott uses in his work in Malaysia and while the Marxist perspective 
is certainly an important part of political anthropology, Scott’s critique is a valid one. 
 In Weber's well known 1918 speech, Politics As a Vocation (1919), Weber 
outlines perhaps one of the most blunt, but important factors in any state level society’s 
powerbase: the monopoly on force. Very often, we tend to focus on the violence aspect of 
this monopoly.  However Weber's theory goes into deeper concepts such as the law, 
criminal courts, and the penal systems which also represent the state’s monopoly on 
force. The state not only has the ability to utilize violent force for its benefit, it also can 
sit in judgment of when force committed by its citizens is justifiable, or when it is 
unjustifiable, and then can remove citizen’s rights and punish them for the perceived 
infraction. (Weber: 1919). 
When studying the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, it is important to have 
a firm grasp of the anthropology of religion. While the standard anthropological 
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definition of religion would not qualify the personality cult created by the state around 
Kim Il-sung and his family as a religion, it bears many of the traits seen anthropologically 



























Chapter 2 - Distribution of Resources and the Economic Pillar of Power 
 
  A group of humans ensures that our economic abilities are amplified and the 
amount of resources we can assemble are far more significant than that which can be 
accomplished by a single individual. We can apply the ‘group’ approach to nearly any 
endeavor, be it commodities such as grain and meat or more complex initiatives such as 
airplanes and string theory. By organizing and coordinating our efforts, the effect of this 
can be observed in small band level groups and massive state level societies which 
encompass hundreds of millions of people. From the time of the first city state the 
allocation of resources has been a question of paramount importance.  Means of exchange 
and an economy have always existed within human culture and have been critical to 
relations and stability within and between cultures (Mauss 1967: 2). By extension within 
a state level society when the means of exchange is more formalized, this becomes an 
opportunity for the state to control to it. 
The greatest stabilizer for a state entity is a robust, thriving economy and a high 
standard of living. Nowhere is this made clearer than in the Democratic People's 
Republic of North Korea. While people’s desires are certainly not limited to the simple 
fulfillment of needs, human history shows that economic disparity and lack of resources 
are an impediment to the functioning of society. Therefore, one could accurately assert 
that economics and standard of living are good indicators of the health of a state, or lack 
thereof. Perhaps one of the most important geopolitical events of the 20th century was the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. While many have offered their own explanations for the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Marvin Harris claims that its collapse came about due to the 
17 
 
collapse of the cultural materialistic structure within the country. Harris’s explanation is 
that the Communist regime in the Soviet Union fell from power due to its failure to adapt 
to new circumstances and the economic expectations of its people. The state was no 
longer able to effectively distribute resources in the amount and level which people 
expected. Therefore the people lost faith in the ability of the regime to govern (Harris 
1992: 299).  
Means of exchange are of particular importance to any anthropological study of a 
society. The means of exchange and economy can display many characteristics of the 
society as a whole. This is in particular supported by Marvin Harris’s cultural materialism 
research approach with regard to the principles of structure, and superstructure. Each of 
these aspects represent a layer of the culture with the infrastructure being the layer of 
culture which is focused on how society interacts with its environment, the structure 
focused on how society organizes itself, and the superstructure how society interacts with 
its self and other societies through concepts such as philosophy, morality and art. The 
objective of the cultural materialistic research strategy is to find causal relationships. 
With an understanding of the economic relationships that function within the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea, it is possible to see how Harris’s cultural materialistic 
approach is applicable to the North Korean case study. For example throughout most of 
the history of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea a distribution based rationing 
system was used and all industrial activities, as well as all commerce, were controlled 
directly by the state. Within Harris's approach the state would essentially have complete 
control over the infrastructure of society (Harris 2001: 53). Additionally, through its 
control of the government, the legal system, the means of commerce through the issuance 
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of ration coupons, and the printing and distribution of money, the North Korean state had 
nearly total control over the superstructure of the society. 
Of additional importance within society, especially within the political economy 
which would fall into Harris's superstructure is the importance of reciprocal gift giving 
within the DPRK. Marcel Mauss's work The Gift (1925) provides an excellent insight 
into the role which gift giving and exchange plays within a society. Mauss states that all 
gifts are given in the expectation of some level of "reciprocity." “The gift not yet repaid 
debases the man who accepted it, particularly if he did so without thought of return... 
Charity wounds him who receives, and our whole moral effort is directed toward 
suppressing the unconscious harmful patronage of the rich almoner."( Mauss 1967: 63). 
In Mauss's viewpoint, the act of giving a gift is less an act of altruistic desire and more a 
patron and client exchange. This can be within the context of a relationship between two 
individuals, two kin groups, or even between the state and its citizens. Mauss uses the 
example of state socialism in the French Republic to illustrate his point, contending that 
within the context of social insurance it represents a patron client relationship in which 
the community owes part of the fruits of their labor to the state, and in return the state 
owes the individual and the community insurance for sickness, unemployment and old-
age(Mauss 1969: 65). 
This example has excellent parallels within the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea. Until the 1990s the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had a distribution 
based economic system. In the system workers owed the state their loyalty and labor and 
in return the state provided them with rations for food and clothing and other necessities 
based on the type of labor they performed. Additionally workers were given a salary. 
19 
 
However, the salary amounted to more of an allowance as the basic necessities were 
provided by the state through rationing coupons. 
  Gifts to the Eternal President Kim Il Sung or the Dear Leader, Kim Jong Il or 
Kim Jong Un can be a symbol of great status and translate to a level of practical clout 
within society. Members of North Korean society who have given such gifts tend to be 
given more lenient treatment for minor infractions against rules and laws.  This can 
include lighter sentences or receiving no punishment at all. However, even gift giving has 
limits within a restricted society.  Gift giving has its roots in the reciprocal relationship 
between the gift giver and the gift receiver (Mauss 1969: 65).   
 Additionally public displays of patriotism or past service in war against Japan, 
the United Nations or South Korea, as well as other noticeable services to the state, could 
be rewarded with more political clout and privileges. "To thank 'patriotic families' like 
ours, Kim Il-Sung had nonetheless, granted them certain privileges. For my grandparents 
the favor came in the form of a particularly fine house. The Great leader also sent them 
gifts from time to time. These might have been bottles of taepyeung sil, a very expensive 
rice sprit which most people can't afford, or else sweets or cakes. The special favors my 
grandparents enjoyed were also explained - or perhaps particularly explained - by the fact 
that one of my great-uncles, who runs a major company in Japan, had been very generous 
towards the Popular Democratic Republic of Korea in the seventies." (Kang 2005:28).  
  The gift givers offer their displays of patriotism, overseas connections and 
fundraising abilities to the central government and in exchange, the central government 
will reward such loyalty and service to the state with privileges and expensive gifts. This 
is a win- win for the state structure as it first receives the gifts which may be as simple as 
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extra work or displays of loyalty, or more substantial, such as connections to wealthy 
foreigners and sources of investment.  
 The second benefit is that it reinforces the economic benevolence of the state 
and encourages other citizens to follow the example set forth by the gift givers. The gift 
givers likewise can receive a level of privilege and status and certain items such as radios 
or televisions which can give them prestige within a community.  This is particularly true 
of items such as televisions as they are very rare and hard to obtain within the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea. "My great-aunts had also brought a color television from 
Japan. This meant that we were incredibly lucky, since on average, only one family in ten 
had a television, and almost all of them were black and white. From that point onwards, 
the whole village came to watch television at our house. About thirty people would pile 
into my grandparents’ house almost every evening, with children at the front and grown-
ups at the back; and at least as many poked their heads through the windows to be sure 
they didn't miss any of the spectacle" (Kang 2005: 42).  
 Political patronage in the form of gift giving in the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea is an important pragmatic rule. The ability to bring resources to the 
government or a political official in return for rewards is one of a few ways to gain 
influence and prestige in a society with an otherwise rigidly controlled economy.  Until 
recently gift giving represented a way to earn resources and gain influence outside of the 
systems set in place by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 
 While many believe the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to be a 
communist nation, this is in fact an incorrect perception. The DPRK’s official state 
ideology is Juche. There is, however, one area where the DPRK is not significantly 
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different from the Communists and that is in regard to the approach to distribution of 
resources, as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a planned socialist economy. 
When discussing state level societies, it is important to contrast their economic systems in 
order to reveal the focus and ideology of the government and also how stable the country 
will be economically.  
 Much of the twentieth century was defined by the struggle between capitalist 
market-based economic nations such as the United States and its Western European allies 
and the communist planned economies such as the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of 
China, and the Eastern European Nations.  History has shown that a planned economic 
system is less efficient than a capitalist market system, which focuses on the distribution 
of goods and services and predicting the needs and desires of its people. However, the 
planned economy also carries with it a number of non-economic advantages as compared 
to the market-based economy. By contrasting these two approaches, one can see the 
advantages to the DPRK using a planned economy.(Martin-Lipset, Bence 1980 & 1994). 
 The planned economy that was used by the DPRK paid its workers a salary.  
The wages were actually quite low in comparison to workers in capitalist economies who 
held the same position.  The government provided a set of rations as part of their overall 
compensation.  This did not just include food, but also included clothing and other 
necessities which were issued at designated rationing stations. The added advantage to a 
controlled market is that wages and prices are set by the government, thus allowing the 
economy to be regulated and shaped by the state to suit its social engineering objectives. 
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 In a capitalist market system, market forces, such as supply and demand, 
generally determine prices, wages, and production levels. An excellent way to 
demonstrate the differences between a market driven economy and a planned economy is 
to view the way rations are allocated within the DPRK. Rations were much higher for 
blue collar laborers such as miners or factory workers when compared with white collar 
workers.  The theory was that the white collar workers expended less energy and thus did 
not require as many food rations. Higher pay was given to workers with more dangerous 
positions (Kang 2005: 21) By using this system, the government of the DPRK created a 
desire within the population to gravitate towards labor and the army over college and 
white collar work. "Most of us, from a very young age, had no desire to go to university. 
The collective ideal was entirely directed towards the army and defense of the country 
against the imperialist puppet aggressor"(Kang 2005: 53). 
 The controlled economic system also differs from the market driven system by 
setting quotas which were required to be met by workers rather than market-based 
demand driving production.  Shortages in quotas could often result in extra work to close 
the gap:  
"Kim Il Sung sometimes issued instructions called 'battle orders'. When he 
did this my father was paid double his salary: two hundred and twenty 
won. The requirement was that the whole mine had to speed up production 
for two hundred days in a row. This was men's work! So, a number of 
times, my father spent a month or even two in the mine without ever 
coming out. He had to do twice as much work as usual, and sleep in the 
dormitories set up in the galleys. No one left the mines until the quota of 
extracted coal had been fulfilled. When, father finally did emerge, dirty 
and tired, his eyes could no longer bear the light of the day. After one 
particular 'battle order', the chief overseer told him to take ten days rest. 




Another  benefit of the controlled market system is that it helps to instill a 
collective sense of loyalty to the system, as a controlled socialist economy by its very 
definition follows a collectivist philosophy. By contrast, a market based economy does 
not require the same allegiance and can be collectivist or individualist in nature. It also 
relies on a profit motive rather than meeting a set production quota which makes 
participation in the market an individualist endeavor rather than a collective effort. 
The primary problem with a controlled market system is that it is not effective in 
the long term. This was not only the problem faced by North Korea, but also by the 
Soviet Union.  Government planners could never accurately predict consumption needs 
and shortages were a common phenomenon. In the case of the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea, these shortage and problems with production proved to be minor for 
the survival of the state in the period from 1951 to the 1990's. During this period North 
Korea relied on aid from the Soviet Union. This actually led to the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea having a higher standard of living than its counterpart in the south, the 
Republic of Korea.  This economic inequity, in spite of a controlled economic system, 
worked in North Korea's favor for many years. The problem was so marked that it was 
not until the 1980's that South Korean troops were allowed on the border. Prior to that 
time, there were concerns of defections to the North.  The fall of the Soviet Union 
changed this. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea experienced a sudden drop in 
economic stability and descended into one of the worst economic downfalls in history. 
One of the results of this economic downfall was a famine that started in the early 
1990's just after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a period which is known as the 
Arduous March by North Koreans. While the lack of Soviet aid in the form of both cash 
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and commodities entering into the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by itself 
would have been devastating for the North Korean economy, it may not have had as 
devastating an impact had it not been for the famine, which lasted from 1994 to 1998 and 
is estimated to have killed over 2 million people (Daniel, Loraine & Peter 2011). The 
famine virtually destroyed the first pillar of the state’s level of control as the control of 
the economy had completely collapsed. In a socialist economic system, especially one as 
strict as the North Korean system, the state control of the economy is paramount to the 
state’s maintaining legitimacy. North Korea practiced economic rationing for nearly all 
provisions, including food and clothing. North Koreans were typically allowed two new 
uniforms each year and food was rationed on a weekly basis from a ration book. During 
the Arduous March the North Korean economy had systematically shut down. As Victor 
Cha describes in The Impossible State (2013), the shutdown was almost like a body 
experiencing hypothermia.  Critical systems were prioritized for dwindling resources and 
less critical ones were denied resources. Popular propaganda campaigns encouraged 
Koreans "Let’s eat two meals a day".  The Korean news channel   ran a special program 
to support this campaign, on a man who ate too much causing his intestines to explode. 
Eventually, the signs of the failing economy became more obvious to North Koreans as 
factories and other work places sporadically stopped functioning, before eventually 
closing down completely. All North Koreans, except for a very select number among the 
upper echelon, had to try to find ways to make money in North Korea's fledgling black 
market. The quest for sustenance and economic survival was beginning to overpower the 
people’s allegiance to the party and the carefully manufactured culture of North Korea.  
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The rise of the black market is a critical causal change in the infrastructure as well 
as the structure of the North Korean state system. As described earlier within Marvin 
Harris's cultural materialist theoretical approach, the infrastructure encompasses the 
means of production and the structure would encompass the systems of exchange. Before 
the economic collapse both of these sections of the economy had been controlled by the 
North Korean state completely. However the change in conditions forced North Koreans 
to adopt a new paradigm rapidly in order to survive, that of a market-based exchange 
system. To illustrate this, consider the example provided by Barbara Demick’s in her 
2009 work, Nothing to Envy which contains personal histories of defectors from the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.  Demick provides an account from a defector, 
referred to as Mrs. Song, during a period when she held a local part-time post with the 
Korean Worker’s Party in which her duties encompassed looking for and reporting 
disloyal attitudes among her neighbors:  
"She had no intention of complying. She knew that none of her 
neighbors were engaged in subversive activities. They weren't enemies of 
the state and she was simply too tired to worry about ideology. The lack of 
food had consumed her energy.  The clothing factory had stopped 
operating entirely in 1991 and for the entire last year she had received no 
money, only food coupons, which were now useless since the public 
distribution center had no food." (Demick 2009: 71-72). 
 
 Eventually Mrs. Song, like many others, was forced to go into business on the 
black market.  During this period, almost everyone was forced to find a means of 
privately earning money, often using the black market. Mrs. Song managed to earn a 
living making cookies and marketing them as an inexpensive meal.  Opening restaurants 
was among the more popular methods for North Koreans to earn money. Farmers sold 
extra food from their personal kitchen gardens as they were able.  Some factory workers 
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and others became adept at breaking into closed factories and scavenging parts to sell for 
scrap metal. Some even stripped copper wiring from electrical poles.  This was not 
dangerous, as most cities outside of the capital of Pyongyang no longer received any 
electricity since fuel was too expensive.   However, it was not just farmers and factory 
workers who were hit hard by the famine and economic collapse. Demick interviewed a 
North Korean defector in Seoul who had worked as a doctor.  She stated that many 
doctors had begun charging money for simple surgeries, performed most of the time 
without an anesthetic, and one of the more lucrative ventures had been abortions. With 
food being scarce and expensive to come by, very few families wanted to have children 
as they could not afford to feed them, so abortions were a grimly popular way for doctors 
to make money. 
These were some of the ways that people made a living in North Korea during the 
famine. However, many chose to leave the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for 
economic opportunities in China and some people traveled through China to South 
Korea.  This migration out of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea created a 
lucrative high paying opportunity for many to become smugglers.  Smuggling, however, 
presented significant risks  because if a person were caught, he or she would very likely 
face death or be sentenced to a labor camp for leaving North Korea. Smugglers would 
bring people across the Chinese/North Korean border including both paying customers 
and sometimes paying female customers, who would be sold as wives to Chinese clients.  
In addition, heroin was and currently remains a popular black market export. Rice, tea 
and other food stuffs were among the most common black market imports. However, 
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items that we might refer to now as luxury goods, such as radios and eventually DVDs 
and DVD players, began to appear in North Korean black markets.   
Suddenly, many North Koreans were exposed to other sources of information. 
Even though the state's control over the economy had eroded, its control over the flow of 
information and culture had not been seriously challenged up until this time. Now it had 
to compete with a growing realization by the public that the party had lied to them about 
the world outside and their own standard of living. In short, the failure of the North 
Korean economy led to the creation of the black market which now threatens the DPRK's 
hold over culture and the flow of information in North Korea. While it has not lost 
complete control, it is in jeopardy of ultimately losing control. One of Kim Jong Il's more 
famous policy decisions, giving priority to the Korean People's armed forces in allocating 
resources, is more commonly known as ‘The Army First’ or  Seon'gun and is 
understandable as a response to the threat against state control. 
One of the key functions of a state is to provide the framework for economic 
commerce for its citizens. A capitalist market based economy is better able to weather 
hardship.  It is true that such a system can result in greater income disparity and large 
concentrations of wealth in the hands of a few. However, it is a more stable, long-term 
approach to maintaining a functional system for people.  The controlled market economy 
creates a sense of collective unity and can help drive further loyalty to the state’s 
authority; it also by its nature concentrates wealth in the hands of the state. The 
concentration of wealth and responsibility in the hands of the state is also its downfall. 
More often than not, planned economies are rarely able to anticipate demands and are 
very seldom able to function long term. Additionally, the lack of planning cannot be 
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blamed on an errant company or individual or the bad investments of a few. Ultimately 
when the state has total control of the economy, it will eventually be blamed for the 
economic misfortunes of a society. It is for this reason that the state must have adequate 
control of the flow of information; it could be argued that the control of information and 



















Perception of Control – The State Control of Information and Culture as the 
Second Pillar of Power. 
The world and society in which we live “reflects” a set of perceptions and 
culturally engrained ideas. While there are universal and natural phenomena which help 
to shape our cultural ideas about the world, most of our perceptions are shaped by culture 
and our own life experience. The notion of reality and how the world works is one that is 
culturally engrained from the time we are young children. And this is a fact of which 
state level societies are very aware. Culture exists independently of state level 
governments. Therefore, how a state level society chooses to interact with culture can 
vary widely.  
 One such example is the Communist Party of China, which one might consider on 
some level to be a native group. The Chinese Communist Party is in fact not a native 
political movement, communism is actually a western political and economic philosophy 
developed in Germany. Besides the economic ideas of communism which were 
previously discussed in chapter one, communism seeks to replace existing social 
traditions with new ones designed to create a new society that would be a better fit to 
serve the state.  
"The ideas of religious liberty and freedom of conscience merely gave 
expression to the sway of free competition within the domain of 
knowledge. 'Undoubtedly,' it will be said, 'religious, moral, philosophical, 
and judicial ideas have been modified in the course of historical 
development. But religion, morality, philosophy, political science, and 
law, constantly survived this change.' 'There are, besides, eternal truths, 
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such as Freedom, Justice, etc., that are common to all states of society. But 
Communism abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes all religion and all 
morality, instead of constituting them on a new basis; it therefore acts in 
contradiction to all past historical experience.” (Marx & Engels 1848: 26).  
 
The Red Army wasted no time destroying temples and shrines to wipe away the 
old religions and practices of ancient China. However, the Chinese Communist Party also 
planned to go even further to remove the Chinese language as well.  Early plans by the 
party had called for removing the Mandarin and Cantonese languages altogether. Many 
believed that these languages were too ingrained with ancient feudal superstitions and 
ideas that were counter to the Communist Party's goals. The idea was to use the 
artificially created language of Esperanto as the new language of China (Zhao 2004: 76). 
Logistically, the plan likely would not have worked and there was no previous large scale 
use of Esperanto in China. Mandarin, along with simplified Chinese characters, was 
adopted instead. This does show the power of the state to exercise efforts to forcefully 
remove traditions and attempt to replace them.  
Such drastic changes will meet with both active and passive resistance from the 
people. Some people actively defy the regime in protest and others may resist in more 
subtle ways, such as teaching languages or traditional ideas in secret (Scott 1985: 31). 
The amount of planning and enforcement of changing cultural traditions makes the 
approach far riskier and less sustainable, as the government has to attempt to force people 
to stop using or thinking about concepts and ideas.  Although our modern states have an 
impressive ability, as well as the technology to monitor their populations, enforcement of 
this type of change is extremely difficult. (Scott 1985: 38). 
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 In North Korea, a more gradual method of cultural reshaping was adopted, one 
that did not try to destroy traditional Korean culture entirely, but rather changed and 
adapted it to suit the needs of the new regime in a way that would increase the power of 
the state. The government set itself to the task of creating a new ideology. The new 
ideology would focus the people’s devotion on the new Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea and legitimize its ruler, Kim Il-sung, as not just a powerful political leader, but as 
an immortal demi-god who would rule over the nation.  
 
 The concept of legitimacy was one of which both the new regime and its Soviet 
backers were keenly aware when they set about the difficult task of establishing a new 
government under Kim Il-sung in the North. 
To understand the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, one must understand 
Juche, the philosophy of Kim Il Sung, the eternal President of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea. Juche as a term can be roughly translated to ‘self-reliance’.  The 
ideology has a primary goal of solidifying the people against foreign powers and ideas 
while at the same time promoting a culture of devotion and loyalty to the state, 
specifically to the ruling Kim family and its patriarch Kim Il-Sung.  Many people today 
refer to the DPRK as a communist nation. While the DPRK does draw its economic 
policies from communism, at its core communism is an international political movement 
that stresses the importance of the party and of the workers of the world uniting. In 
contrast Juche focuses on North Korea although it does borrow some terminology and 
facets of Soviet and Maoist style communism.   
For example, the official party name is the Korean People’s Workers Party.  
During the Soviet occupation of Korea and the early years of the Democratic People’s 
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Republic of Korea, Kim Il-sung's rhetoric was in line with that of other early satellites of 
the Soviet Union.  Kim Il-sung had been a member of the Korean resistance movement 
during Japan’s period of colonization of Korea. The North Korean accounts identify him 
as a heroic leader of the resistance, bravely charging machine gun nests and fighting the 
Japanese day in and day out throughout the war. The reality is somewhat more clouded.  
He was indeed a member of the resistance and did do a significant amount of fighting 
against the Japanese. However, much of Kim Il-sung’s time during World War II was 
spent training in Russia, which was under a non-aggression pact with Japan, until the 
final days of the war in the Pacific. During this time Kim attained the rank of captain in 
the Soviet Red Army and attended infantry school.  It is also known that his son Kim 
Jong-il was born inside the Soviet Union.  During the time Kim Il-sung was in the Red 
Army, he joined in the Soviet "liberation" of Korea from Japanese occupation.  In 
response, the United States put together its own force to occupy Korea.  Thus Korea, like 
Germany, had become a front line of the Cold War, and a nation divided by the two 
superpowers (Eckert, Lee, Lew, Robinson and Wagner 1990: 333) 
 As in most communist countries, capitalism and imperialism were strongly 
rejected because they were seen as tools of oppression used against the people. When the 
Soviets installed Kim as the head of the new provisional authority it was more the result 
of a lack of other options rather than Kim's impressive war record or devotion to the 
Communist Party. The portion of Korea north of the 38th parallel was not really a 
significant location for communism.There were very few Communists.  In fact, the area 
had more members of the Christian Korean community. Therefore the Soviets had to 
establish the party in Korea from the ground up, utilizing Kim Il-sung's revolutionary and 
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resistance credentials to attract supporters. Additionally, in much the same pattern as 
other communist nations, secularization was a priority of Kim Il-sung's government. 
Buddhist temples and Christian churches were burned and clergy were eliminated. This 
has a particular ironic component to it as Kim Il-sung was raised in a Protestant 
household. 
Many of the writing and propaganda styles in the early years mirrored their Soviet 
counterparts and the Soviet domination of Kim Il-sung was quite obvious, as stated by 
Tatiana Gabroussenko's 2010 book, Soldiers of the Cultural Front.  Early literature in the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea was geared toward Soviet-Korean cooperation.  
"The first artistic task that Kim Il-sung gave to North Korean writers in 
1946 was the production of accolades to Soviet-Korean  friendship and 
eulogies to the Soviet Liberations and the Soviet way of life. North 
Korean writers quickly responded to this demand by producing pro soviet 
writings in various genres. An important niche in these tributes was 
occupied by Ssoryon Kihaenggi, travelogues of the carefully stage-
managed trips made by North Korean writers to the Soviet Union in 1946-
1955."( Gabroussenko 2010: 20).  
 
This shows the early influence of the Stalinist Soviet Union on North Korea.  The 
lack of an existing Korean Communist Party or Marxist Koreans in great numbers in the 
North during the early years meant that the Soviets had to establish a Korean communist 
regime with little to no native support. North Korean analyst, B.R. Myer’s 2010 work, 
The Cleanest Race,  states that "The peoples party had waited until 1948 to receive  its 
own  crash course in Marxism-Leninism and was therefore  unable to provide  much 
guidance to writers and artists. Reading out a speech crudely plagiarized from Mao, Kim 
Il-sung told them to study Marxism and ‘communicate with the masses in words they 
understand’" (Myers 2010:32)  
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 As the Soviets left the peninsula, the focus shifted away from strict Marxism to 
Juche: 
"In an ideological context, Juche consisted of four formal tenets: (1) Man 
is master of his own fate; (2) the master of the revolution is the people; (3) 
the revolution must be pursued in a self reliant manner: and (4) the key to 
the revolution is the supreme leader, or Suryong, Kim Il-sung. It was 
communist, in that it constituted a partial adoption of Marxism and 
Leninism. It accepted, for example, that capitalists and imperialists were 
the enemy and that the revolution would be won by class struggle of the 
laborers over their oppressors. But it placed less emphasis on the scientific 
view of history as an evolutionary, deterministic process, ultimately 
reaching a point of capitalist contradiction and socialist utopia." (Cha 
2012: 37).  
 
 The first tenant, “man is the master of his own fate”, helps to empower 
individuals and give a personal sense of investment. The second tenant “the master of the 
revolution is the people” directs the individual's empowerment into a collective 
movement towards a unified purpose. The third tenet “the revolution must be pursued in 
a self relient manner” enforces xenophobia and encourages the collective to look inward 
and distrust external influence. The final tenant, “the key to the revolution is the supreme 
leader, or Suryong, Kim Il Sung” serves to enshrine the leader at the top of this newly 
created cultural identity. The new reality created within the concept of Juche is designed 
to enshrine Kim Il-sung at the head of this new system as its unquestioned leader (Cha 
2012: 41). 
 Upon further reviewing Juche, it is possible to understand this ideology by 
examining each component of the Juche philosophy and then extracting its cultural or 
historical basis. This attachment to communism has helped to do more than just assemble 
the people into a workable mass that can be controlled by the state. It also helped DPRK 
to gain money and support effectively from two major communist nations during the 
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Cold War, the People’s Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
Indeed Kim Il-sung as noted above owed his ascension to the head of the DPRK to the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics after the end of World War II.  While Juche 
contained elements of Marxism, it also contained elements that were nationalistic in 
nature. One of the key emphases was on racial purity and homogeneity, something that 
was more in line with the fascist nations of Europe and Imperial Japan than Soviet 
Russia. 
To fully understand the role which the media and propaganda play in North 
Korea, one must first recognize that the Korean peninsula has almost always been under 
the influence of other regional powers. At first, the Chinese were the primary influence 
on Korea, bringing Confucianism to the peninsula.  For a time, Korea actually strove to 
be more adherent to Confucian ideologies than the Chinese. Some of the important, 
nationalistic myths that were developed by the DPRK used folklore and tales that had 
been previously utilized by the ill-fated Korean Nationalist Movement and even at one 
point the Japanese colonial authority. During the war and for much of Korea's history 
under Japan, there were points and areas where the Japanese had attempted to erase 
Korean culture and replace it with Japanese traditions. In spite of this there had actually 
been an attempt to revive and instill in the Korean colony a sense of pride in their 
“Koreaness”. The purpose of propaganda was to do this while envisioning a unique 
Korean people within the Japanese empire. There were many posters encouraging 
Koreans to re-inhabit their ancestral homelands in Manchuria. The Japanese obviously 
had little interest in Korean culture or the well being of Koreans, but were willing to 
cultivate the Korean image to aid in their conquest of Manchuria. Korean nationalists 
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drew upon old Korean mythology which placed the Korean people as originating on 
Mount Pektu, a volcanic mountain located in the modern DPRK.(Meyers 2010: 28). The 
myth indicated that this was the birthplace of the Korean people who, under the 
command of Tangun, conquered the Korean peninsula and created the earliest nation of 
humans. The DPRK was quick to exploit this nationalistic myth and spin it to their 
advantage. Very suddenly, it was revealed that Kim Il-sung's main base of operations for 
his guerilla army was none other than Mount Pektu (Meyers 2010: 64)This linked Kim Il-
sung, Tangun and the original conquest of Korea, and made this creation myth central to 
the propagandist remaking of North Korean Culture.  A key portion focuses on the Prince 
of the Heavens Hwanung and two animals, a tiger and bear, who wish to become human. 
While at first Hwanung was hesitant to grant their request, as the laws of heaven forbade 
this, he was eventually was moved by their dedication and resilience to give them a way 
to become human: 
"Recognizing that their determination was undaunted, Hwanung finally 
said ' Here are a bundle of mugwart and 20 cloves of garlic. Take these to 
the cave, and stay in the cave for a full 100 days, eating only the 
wormwood and garlic and without exposing yourself to sunlight, that you 
may become human beings'. As the she bear and tiger were mighty 
pleased to receive the mugwort and garlic from Hwanung, They returned 
to the cave after repeatedly expressing gratitude to him.  For a while, they 
stayed in the cave eating only mugwort and garlic without seeing the 
sunlight. But the quick tempered tiger felt cramped and bored staying in 
the pitch dark cave. It was not long before the tiger bolted out of the cave 
and thus failed in his attempt to become human. As a result of overcoming 
the ordeal however, the persevering she bear turned into a beautiful 
woman in 21 days, shorter than the speculated period of 100 days. The she 
bear turned woman was called Ungnyo. As she was reincarnated as a 
woman, she wanted to do something worthy of a woman. Since the tiger 
failed to become a man, she had no partner to turn to. Ungnyo prayed to 
God under the sandalwood tree every day that she might have the honor of 
becoming a woman to concieve the first son of mankind. Shaken by her 
sincere entreaty, Hwanung decided to comply with her request once again. 
After Hwanung changed his figure by divine power , he became a 
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handsome young man and made Ungnyo his wife. Their conjugal union 
made them the first married couple in the earthly world. Shortly thereafter, 
a son was born to the happily married couple. The prince was called 
‘Tangun Wang-gom', so named  because his birth had something to do 
with a sandalwood tree. It went without saying that his birth became a 
source of great joy for the couple. Tangun was born with no less natural 
talent than Hwanung's. As expected, after taking over his father’s huge 
task, Tangun helped place the kingdom on a solid foundation. Later 
Tangun moved his capital from mount T'aebak to P'yongyang... As time 
went on, Choson founded by Tangun, became more and more prosperous. 
Later the King moved his capital to Asadal at the foothill of Mt.Paekak... 
During the Koryo dynasty" (Hwang 2006: 11-12).  
 
The significance of Mount Pektu or Parkak is central in Korean myth and is not 
only important to the myth of Tangun, but also to myths surrounding the creation of the 
Kingdom of Korguyo. Combining this with the selection of Pyongyang as his capital 
helped to give the young Leader Kim Il-sung a mythological claim to the legitimate rule 
of Korea. 
  The fact that Korea was a very Confucian nation was not lost on the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea's small army of propagandists who immediately sought to 
play on the Confucian attitudes of the people and culture to increase the legitimacy and 
authority of Kim Il-sung. The Confucian system places a great deal of importance on 
respect for one’s ancestors, and particularly for one’s father as head of the household. 
Korean mothers are also of great importance in the Korean family and therefore highly 
regarded. The propagandists' goal was to paint Kim Il-sung as the Father of the Korean 
people and Korea as the Mother of the Korean people. This also had the intended effect 
of equating ordinary Korean citizens with children, children of Kim Il-sung, the father of 
the Korean people.  
This is often seen in propaganda posters and paintings with regard to the way 
people are painted with rosy cheeks and youthful faces. Kim Il-sung is almost always 
38 
 
shown as a smiling warm fatherly figure.  He is commonly shown giving instructions or 
advice to workers in different areas of labor. Unlike many other Communist bloc 
countries, where the emphasis of propagandists was on making leaders and officials 
appear to be strong willed super men, here the emphasis was on making the head of state 
feel like a kind warm fatherly figure who cares for his people as a father would for his 
children. This was combined with the effective elimination of all religions. Through his 
cult of personality, Kim was able to raise himself to god like status.  
While in the anthropological sense we might not classify North Korea's Kim Il-
sung’s cult of personality as a religion, it cannot be denied that it did for all intents and 
purposes serves the function of legitimizing his rule by drawing on a supernatural 
principle, while helping to keep his people compliant. As noted by Victor Cha, "The State 
took draconian measures to erase any influences, political and religious, which might 
detract from fidelity to Kim. Over two thousand Buddhist temples and Christian churches 
were burned. As Jasper Becker notes, the persecution of Christian missionaries was 
especially intense given the relative success of the missionaries in Korea compared with 
other parts of Asia" (Cha 2011: 72). Removing these religious organizations effectively 
removed all other community structures that would have been a source of community 
organization, other than the party. The propagandists also seized upon this as an 
opportunity to replace the older religions with the Korean People's Workers Party. "Kim 
was replacing God with himself in the minds of North Koreans. Through destroying 
others, he made himself the creator of everything material and spiritual in the North 
Korean state. Nothing existed before him. State Propaganda thereafter referred to Kim as 
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superior to Christ in love, Buddha in benevolence, Confucius in virtue, and Mohamed in 
justice."(Cha 2011: 73).   
 To those in Western Democratic states, this might seem to be nothing more than 
obvious propaganda. However, it is imperative to try to understand the North Korean 
context. The repetition of this particular propaganda in an environment that has no other 
outlets will eventually lead to people accepting it as reality. In Barbara Demick’s work 
she tells the story in which Mrs. Song talks about her devotion to the party during the 
years before the Arduous March. "Mrs. Song believed what she said. All those years of 
sleep deprivation, all those lectures and self-criticisms - the very same tools used in 
brainwashing or interrogations - had wiped out any possibility of resistance. She had been 
molded into one of Kim Il-sung's empowered human beings. Kim Il-sung's goal wasn't 
merely to build a new country; he wanted to build a better people, to reshape human 
nature"(Demick 2009:43-44). The cult of personality of Kim Il-sung had been well 
established to the point of God status amongst his subjects. This was expertly done 
through the state propaganda and myth making.  His leadership was not in question. 
 Much of the state's propaganda sought to build upon existing xenophobic tensions 
that had developed during both the Korean War and Korea’s period as a Japanese colony. 
The importance placed on the homogeneity and the cleanness of the Korean people, as 
well as hostility toward foreigners, was actively encouraged by regime propagandists.  
The leaders of the DPRK were able to use this already present xenophobic orientation to 
draw the Korean people to their cause. They put in place severe restrictions on 
interactions with outsiders visiting the country, as well as imposed serious penalties for 
those who violated these restrictions.  
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In the BBC documentary, This World: Escaping North Korea - 2009, the film 
crew interviewed a young woman who had escaped from North Korea to China but was 
eventually found and repatriated to the DPRK while in the late stages of pregnancy. " I 
tried to resist, but they forced a poisonous injection into my unborn baby". This is an 
extreme example of how racial purity is considered to be an important part of Korean 
culture. It is not just a sense of blood purity, but also a sense of ideological purity 
including the idea that the Korean people are innocent and childlike and their virtuous 
minds are in need of protection from the cruel outside world. Xenophobia is not unique to 
the DPRK. South Korea has also had its struggles with xenophobia.  This is a predictable 
reaction from a people and nation who have been invaded and subjugated by foreign 
powers.  Although there is still a level of xenophobia and anti-foreigner sentiment in 
South Korea, it has sharply decreased over the years.  In contrast the DPRK has 
deliberately maintained a strong level of xenophobia. 
 A central component of Juche is its resistance toward outside influences and the 
emphasis on the pure homogeneity of the Korean people. The image of the Korean 
people as a pure race that needs protection from the cruel non- Korean world helps to 
reinforce the strength of the position of the leader, or rather the ruling Kim family.  Many 
North Koreans still express an affinity for the Kims despite their new found liberty and 
access to sources of information.   
Xenophobia was encouraged by the state with special attention toward enemy 
groups such as American soldiers and Christian ministers. Stories are told of Christian 
ministers injecting diseases into Korean children to kill them.  American and South 
Korean soldiers were said to have spent much of the war driving around bayoneting 
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children. Korean propaganda posters would portray American soldiers as tall and skinny 
with hooked noses.  This was to add to the image of the Americans as ugly, imperialist, 
warmongers who wanted to destroy the wonderful, virtuous people of the DPRK. 
However xenophobia and hatred of foreigners was not just directed toward enemies such 
as the Americans or South Koreans. Even the DPRK’s allies were often harassed en mass 
by average North Korean citizens.  
 Xenophobia is a potent force for an isolationist state such as the DPRK, even 
against its own allies. In today’s context, we often hear of the perils of North Korean 
refugees crossing into China.  However, lesser known were the five American soldiers 
who chose to defect to North Korea when stationed on the demilitarized zone along the 
38th parallel. James Dresnok is the central figure of focus in the 2009 documentary, 
Crossing the Line, which chronicles his life both before and after his defection. As a 
defector he was often used at first in propaganda films, aimed at encouraging other 
American servicemen to defect to North Korea. However after growing weary of his time 
in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea he and several other American defectors 
tried to request asylum at the Soviet Embassy. They were refused and turned over to the 
North Korean authorities. From this point on, the North Korean authorities decided to use 
the defectors in a more active role.  They became actors playing the villainous American 
imperialists in numerous North Korean films. Film was one of North Korea's most 
capable forms of propaganda, both on television and in theaters. 
  Televisions were quite rare in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.  Even 
if someone could afford a television, they needed special permission from their job site to 
buy one. Even then, there were special seals on the televisions to prevent tampering with 
42 
 
them to pick up foreign broadcasts.  If the security forces found those seals to have been 
tampered with, there were significant consequences, which could range from a time in a 
work camp to more severe punishments such as permanent imprisonment in a penal labor 
colony. 
 Cinema, on the other hand, was a popular and affordable activity for North 
Korean citizens.  Films also provided an important propaganda tool for the North Korean 
state to use in its efforts to manipulate the people and help instill loyalty to the party and 
more importantly to Kim Il-sung. This is one of the more well-known areas of 
contribution by Kim Jong-il. His earliest pursuits were in developing North Korea's film 
industry. He is perhaps best known for the monster movie Pulgasari in 1985.  Other than 
its confusing plot, this movie is probably known as being one of kidnapped South Korean 
actress Shin Sang-ok's more well-known films from her period of captivity in North 
Korea. Kim Jong-il had actually ordered her kidnapping to help develop the film 
industry. Despite the sometimes ridiculous plot points and the heavy insertion of 
propaganda into every facet of the films, movies were still very popular in the DPRK as 
well as TV programming, for those who could afford TV's.   
 Programming was varied despite people having access only to North Korean 
broadcasts.  Situation comedies, dramas, news broadcasts, and films were often a staple 
of North Korean television. North Korean defectors have indicated that occasionally 
foreign films from the Soviet Union were broadcast on national TV and that these were 
preferable because they were less heavily laden with propaganda, or at least the 
propaganda was more subtle.  
Another interesting program that has recently become available via the Internet is 
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a North Korean children's program that in online circles is known as Hedgehog and 
Squirrel. It is unclear if Hedgehog and Squirrel is a TV program as would think of it in 
the West. This series has been in constant production since 1977, with early animation 
taking a stylistic influence from Russian cartoons and later styles taking more influence 
from Japanese animation. This children's program centers around the portrayal of 
Hedgehogs, Squirrels and Cranes, who live in the land of Flower Hill, which is meant to 
be an allegory for North Korea. The animals of Flower Hill are engaged in a desperate 
battle against armies of mice, likely the South Koreans, as well as Weasels that are meant 
to represent the Japanese and wolves that are thought to represent the Americans. In the 
earlier cartoons it is difficult to see some of the obvious differences between the animals. 
However in later episodes, the show has adopted a more sophisticated animated style and 
one is able to see some of the propaganda elements more clearly. For example, the 
Flower Hill characters tend to have larger, child-like faces, as well soft child-like voices, 
suggesting a play on North Korea's attempt to encourage its citizens to think of 
themselves as child-like. By contrast, the Wolves and Weasels have larger stature, 
narrower eyes and deeper and sometimes more menacing voices. 
 This cartoon serves the purpose of helping introduce young children to the 
propaganda of the North Korean regime in a way that they will be more readily able to 
identify with and watch. The first episode in particular could be seen as a historic parable 
for the early 20th century history of Korea. In the episode, the village of Flower Hill is a 
peaceful spot in a world that is otherwise being oppressed and conquered by a Weasel 
army. Flower Hill remains free of the Weasels, because it is protected by ‘Mr. Bear’.  The 
bear is thought to represent  the Soviet Union or possibly even Imperial Russia, as the 
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Russians had a great deal of influence over Korea prior to the Russo-Japanese war of 
1905. Mr. Bear successfully protects the Hill from several Weasel attacks.  However a 
visiting group of Hedgehogs warn the Squirrels about depending too much on Mr. Bear. 
In the episode the Weasels, using their allies the Mice, possibly meant to represent South 
Korea or Japanese sympathizers, manage to kill Mr. Bear by tricking him into drinking a 
poisoned bottle of liquor, thus removing Flower Hill’s only defense. Just when it seems 
like the Squirrels will be enslaved, they are saved by the Hedgehogs and the Hedgehogs 
allies, the Cranes. After being rescued, the Squirrels swear to join the hedgehogs and 
cranes and pay back the Weasels 1000 fold for burning Flower Hill.  
The earlier episodes are more ambiguous with regard to whom, exactly, the 
Weasels represent. However, as the series progresses and the animation becomes more 
sophisticated, one begins to see the different animal types take on more distinct identities, 
with the Weasels wearing uniforms reminiscent of the Japanese during World War II.  
The Wolves wear uniforms reminiscent of the American Army during the Korean War.  
Another notable fact is that the show does not seem to have an exact animal parable. 
However the series does encourage patriotism and a desire to serve in the armed forces. 
Additionally, the show does not portray the Wolves or the Weasels as weak. It actually 
shows them as being very powerful and often having better technology than Flower Hill. 
There is an inference, a subtle cue to the North Korean children that though they are 
opposed by more powerful enemies, they can defeat them. 
The cult of personality surrounding the Kim family has been one of the most 
critical propaganda tools used by the regime to maintain power. The cult of personality 
centers on the nation's first leader and still eternal president, Kim Il-sung. Leaders and 
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ruling governments the world over understand the importance which images play in 
establishing the credibility and appeal of a leader to the masses. While many leaders have 
been said to possess unique abilities and qualities which elevate them above the average 
person, most are still viewed as humans, at least within the modern context. The 
personality cult manufactured by the North Korean regime has in many ways moved 
beyond this by incorporating elements of religious worship into its make-up. Clifford 
Geertz stated that religion is composed of four anthropological components, "(1) a system 
of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and 
motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) 
clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and 
motivations seem uniquely realistic" (Geertz 1966: 90 ). 
With regard to the first aspect of religion described by Geertz,  Juche philosophy 
and the veneration of Kim Il-sung create a potent combination that symbolically serves as 
a vehicle for his promotion to near God-like status. Images of Kim Il-sung, as well as his 
son and grandson, adorn the homes of all North Koreans and must be kept clean at all 
times. Additionally, any photos taken of images or statues of the Kims must capture the 
full image and not be obstructed in any way. Many images of Kim Il-sung also tend to 
portray him in a warm benevolent light as a father figure, which helps to engender 
genuine emotional attachment as well as respect for the traditional patriarchal Confucian 
kinship structure in Korean society. This exemplifies the second component of Geertz's 
definition of religion in the anthropological sense. The details of the myth surrounding 
Kim Il-sung's death, such as a flock cranes attempting to return Kim to Heaven, seem to 
imply a level of divinity and are consistent with the fifth aspect of religion proposed by 
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Geertz.  Kim's personality cult incorporates multiple religious aspects which enhance the 
Kim family's political legitimacy and high status in North Korea. In an officially atheistic 
society, this cult functions as a quasi religion. 
The importance of cultural manipulation and control of culture is the second pillar 
of state level power and is central to the regime and the Kim family's political rule in 
North Korea. Through the cultivation of political myth and the control of the influx of 
information the regime is able to engineer and actively change the society's perception of 
the world and thus manipulate the culture to suit their designs. The manipulation of 
traditional existing culture helped to transition North Korean society into a collective that 
was more malleable to the regime. However, this pillar depended on a complete 
monopoly of the flow of information from the outside world. The regime is only able to 
maintain control of individual North Koreans if it is able to control what information 
about the outside world is available to the general populous. When outside information 
began to challenge the narrative constructed by the state, the regime began to lose control 
and the narrative became a questionable concept rather than an absolute truth. The regime 









Chapter 4 - Pillar Three - The Monopoly of Violence. 
 The ability to use force is perhaps one of the state's most powerful and direct 
methods of controlling its population. Weber indicates that while the state may not be the 
only actor committing violence, it is the only one who can successfully legitimize 
violence and force.  
“Every state is founded on force,' said Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk. That is 
indeed right. If no social institutions existed which knew the use of 
violence, then the concept of 'state' would be eliminated, and a condition 
would emerge that could be designated as 'anarchy,' in the specific sense 
of this word. Of course, force is certainly not the normal or the only means 
of the state--nobody says that--but force is a means specific to the state. 
Today the relation between the state and violence is an especially intimate 
one." (Weber, 1918: 1). 
 
 While most frequently, such a statement is associated with violent force, law and 
surveillance are also a component in the monopoly of force. The monopoly of violence is 
the state’s third pillar of power.  
The monopoly of violence is the most basic way in which the state can manipulate 
its people to obey its will. This can be achieved through laws and legal codes, 
imprisonment, using overt threats of violence against the populace or subsets of the 
populace. Within the context of the DPRK, the regime's monopoly of violence has always 
been a present factor in the everyday lives of the people. However, with the collapse of 
the regime's control of the economy (the first pillar of power), the use of violence has 
become more central in the state's strategy to maintain control. 
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 In order to understand how this third pillar affects the society at large, it is 
necessary to examine how force has been applied within the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea. This can be done by looking at accounts of personal experiences from 
North Koreans who have escaped the regime. By examining the methods of force used by 
the regime, it is possible to understand more effectively the nature of the state and its 
third pillar of power. 
 While it may seem that the force of the state is expressed through the use of 
military force and the implementation of a security network to obtain the compliance of 
its citizens, the role that legal codes and regulations play in gaining compliance of a 
population must be considered (Rosen 2006:163–164). Although the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea is not a communist state in the traditional sense, the state 
philosophy, Juche, still uses a socialist economic model, which rejects private ownership 
of property in favor of public ownership. The legal codes against private ownership and 
property protected the state from ideas of individualism taking root in people.  This is not 
to imply that North Koreans or individuals living in a communist state have no concept of 
self or individuality. However, they are encouraged to think of themselves as part of a 
communal group and to place the ambitions, goals and values of the collective before 
their own individual aspirations. The reasons why the state fears an individualist outlook 
are revealed in the 2014 documentary Frontline: Inside North Korea, which states  
" looking at footage shot inside North Korea, we can see that a huge 
number of people have started doing business with each other. This used 
to be illegal and anyone caught buying or selling for personal gain was 
severely punished... people's willingness to confront or ignore authority 
has become more common. People around the world have this image of 
North Koreans as brainwashed but that is very mistaken. Often now, when 
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North Koreans are challenged for infringing in relation to a certain law, as 
long as the offense is not political, they do not hesitate to protest if they 
feel the law to be irrational."(Frontline: Inside North Korea 2014).   
 
This presents two key facts regarding force in North Korea.  First, it demonstrates that, in 
some ways, the state’s monopoly on force is weakening. The fact that people are now 
willing to defy authority openly, even on minor issues, indicates that the regime is not in 
total control.   
It should be noted that the regime has chosen mostly to ignore illegal markets and 
market activity for certain commodities. While simple necessities such as food and 
transportation might receive only a minor chastisement, items such as electronics or 
foreign media will likely lead to a more significant punishment. Executions have become 
a far more frequent occurrence in modern North Korea due to the period of famine and 
economic decline known as the Arduous March. Execution has always been in place for 
severe political crimes and it also served as a severe punishment for crossing the border 
illegally. "In North Korea, Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong Il are perceived as gods. They have 
supreme power. If an individual or group criticizes them in any way even once, the 
person(s) may be charged and suffer imprisonment or public execution. You may have 
reservations or opinions in your heart but you can never express them." (UN Human 
Rights Commission Transcripts, Seoul August 24th, 2013). It can be difficult to identify 
what may be seen as a political crime and what is not a political crime.  In the early days 
simply leaving the country without authorization could be considered a political offense 
and result in life imprisonment. 
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While regulation and laws create a code of conduct that must be followed, 
voluntary compliance is still required for them to work. While utilization of effective 
propaganda and cultural manipulation can assist in conditioning the population to follow 
the laws and regulations, a strict regime of punishment for crimes committed provides a  
strong deterrent to the commission of crime.  
 As the economic system in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has 
worsened and smuggling, as well as black market activity, have increased, foreign media 
have become more common place.  The regime has gone to great lengths to deter its 
citizens from viewing foreign media.  
"The officials, who also faced charges of bribery and womanizing, were 
thought to be close to Kim's executed uncle, Jang Song-thaek, Yonhap 
news agency reported...All television and media is under strict state 
control and access to the internet is limited, but despite a harsh crackdown, 
banned foreign shows and films have been gaining popularity in recent 
years....Some are believed to be secretly streamed over the internet, while 
others are smuggled into the country on DVDs, video cassettes or memory 
sticks sold on the black market."(Dearden 2014:1).    
Currently the use of public execution in the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea serves to remove possible opposition and ensures that its populace is under control. 
This form of punishment and state control is not just for the average citizen, but also for 
the most elite among the population. The use of public execution is perhaps one of the 
most effective reminders of the power of the state.  These laws seem to be specifically 
targeted to support or attempt to strengthen or regain the state’s total monopoly on the 
flow of information and its regulation of the culture. The International Federation for 
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Human Rights published a white paper assessing the current situation with regard to the 
use of the death penalty in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.  
"The scope of crimes punishable by the death sentence has further 
increased following the announcement in September 2012 of two public 
decrees called “circulation of foreign media punishable by execution” (by 
the Department of People’s Security) and “execution by gun squad for 
divulging classified information via cell phone” (by the State Security 
Department, SSD).  As a result, the total number of crimes that carry the 
death penalty in the country stands at twenty four. Of these, at least nine 
have a mandatory death sentence requirement, including crimes like 
kidnapping, theft, damaging or destruction of state or military property, 
currency counterfeiting, smuggling and introducing narcotics or jewels 
and colored metals into the black market."(The Death Penalty in North 
Korea: 19).  
 
Further examples of public execution listed in this report come from the period of famine 
in North Korea. The regime responded with the use of execution as a way to quickly 
reestablish its dominance, or at least to establish fear in the populace to ensure 
compliance.  
 North Korea utilizes a system of collective punishment, depending on the crime 
committed.  The perpetrators could find not just themselves entering a prison camp, but 
could also find their entire family and extended family for up to 3 generations brought to 
a prison camp. These camps serve as an additional method of the regime to use its 
monopoly of violence to maintain and attempt to regain control of its other two pillars of 
power, economic and information/cultural. 
"The background of my comrades who worked with me were mostly from 
privileged families. In 1987, I was the only one who was summoned from Hong-eun [ph] 
area. The ranks of comrades who worked with me belonged to the family of descendants 
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of those who fought against Japanese colonial rule, who were loyal to the regime." (UN 
Human rights Commission  Transcripts - 2013.12.19: 2). The goal of stationing the sons 
of privileged families at the camp could be to ensure loyalty. The use of soldiers from 
privileged families ensures the solders will have a higher than average loyalty to the 
regime, as they have lived and grown up with a comfortable lifestyle. Additionally should 
they break the rules they know exactly what the consequences would be to them and their 
family.  
The type of camp for imprisonment and the duration of stay at the camp is 
dependent on the crime: 
"When I was questioned, I wrote down everything about Song 
Hae-rim. But if I knew that I was going to be taken to Yodok camp, I 
would have not written down about Song Hae-rim. So that’s why I wrote 
down everything about Song Hae-rim and her coming to my house and 
about her going to live with the immediate family of Kim Il-sung. The 
people who are taken to Yodok camp, [0:24:00] I mean I was taken to the 
camp without trial and I didn’t even know what crime I had committed. 
And, maybe Kim Jong-il asked Song Hae-rim whom she has talked to 
about her going to, and maybe Hae-rim told Kim Jong- il that she told me 
that she was going to Kim Jong-il’s family. " (UN Human Rights 
commission transcripts 8.21.15).   
As can be seen in this example from the United Nations Report on human rights 
abuses in the DPRK, the regime is very willing to imprison its people as needed, to 
ensure that it is able to control its image in the eyes of the public. As one former camp 
prisoner described in an interview about her experience, "There were people there from 
all over the country, and we were worked to death". (BBC This World: Escaping North 
Korea 2009). As recounted in the BBC documentary Escaping North Korea, many North 
Korean refugees escaped by hiding in China  and Thailand, where they would be allowed 
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to enter an embassy belonging to the Republic of Korea so they could officially defect. 
Many of the refugees featured in this film had been previously captured.  They either had 
escaped from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or were captured in the 
People's Republic of China and then repatriated to the DPRK."I was sent back to North 
Korea. An intelligence agent beat me up, and demanded to know if I had met anyone 
from Korean Churches. I said 'no', But he said that I was lying and beat me again. I was 
interrogated over and over and then sent to a forced labor camp.”(BBC: Escaping North 
Korea 2009).  This punishment could also be used if you had knowledge or were privy to 
a fact that might be embarrassing to the state or the Kim family. 
While previously, a crime such as leaving the country might have brought a death 
sentence or you and your family being sent to a forced labor camp permanently, during 
the Arduous March punishments were more lenient by comparison.  You might spend 
only a few years in a camp, but that time in the camp would be brutal.  Lack of food is 
common within the forced labor camps, the rations are incredibly small and it is often 
against the rules of the camp to catch rats or other small animals for food. 
 North Korea today maintains the world's 4th largest standing army with just over 
a million troops on active duty.  However, when one adds in reserve forces, the North 
Korean military is the largest in the world at nearly 9.5 million. Military spending is 25% 
of the country's GDP.  For a country with a failed economy, as well as a population of 24 
million, that means that the armed forces are enormously large in proportion to the 
overall population of the country.  This focus on the military serves two purposes. One is 
to help establish Kim Jong-il and now Kim Jong Un as the defender of the Korean 
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people. Propaganda paintings and videos from the Seon'gun period focus on Kim Jong-
il's commitment to national defense. One propaganda painting portrays a smiling Kim 
walking up to the bow of a naval vessel in rough waters while the sailors around him fear 
the waves. This increased focus on the military has also coincided with an increase in 
anti-U.S. and anti-South Korean propaganda, blaming the U.S. for the famine and 
economic woes of North Korea. The propaganda payoff of this is to deflect blame for the 
economic mismanagement of the country onto North Korea's enemies and portray Kim 
Jong Il and now his son Kim Jong-Un as the tireless defenders of the North Korean 
people. The second purpose for placing the military first is to ensure that the Kim 
family's last method for maintaining power over their country is maintained.  Massive 
force could be used to ensure that the population remains compliant and under the control 
of the current leadership.  The use of propaganda and deflection is preferable to the use of 
military force.  Although force can quell the populace and  ensure compliance, an act of 
mass violence could have an undesirable backlash and result in dissolution of the power 
of the state. Two examples of the use of force are instructive. 
The first example of is the attempt at a coup de tat by leaders of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991 on the eve of signing of the Union Treaty. The second 
example is the successful attempt to use mass violence to restore government control that 
resulted in the Tiananmen Square massacre. Examining both of these case studies will 
demonstrate the effective use of power and why one approach may succeed over the 
other. 
The Soviet Union had undergone a major shift in the late 1980s. Soviet Premier 
Mikhail Gorbachev had introduced a package of reforms which had greatly improved the 
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autonomy of the member states and trade arrangements.  This resulted in the Soviet 
Union being more open to outsiders and granted ordinary Soviet citizens more freedom. 
In particular, the Union Treaty would have given a much greater level of autonomy to the 
individual republics of the Soviet Union. Worried that this would lead to the breakup of 
the Soviet Union, key members of the Politburo standing committee staged a coup and 
sent columns of tanks into Moscow. The goal was to put down a protest by ordinary 
Russians in the Soviet Parliament Building, known as the White House. This move was 
partially negated, as many of the tank crews sided with Boris Yeltsin and the ordinary 
Russians. Later in the night a military operation occurred which attempted to remove the 
protesters from the White House.  The attempt failed and the public failure only helped to 
speed the decline of the Soviet Union by further eroding people’s faith in the system.  
The actions failed to create the necessary fear that those staging the coup had hoped 
would move people back to compliance and submission. Additionally, the government 
had lost too much of its ability to spin the story and the failure to remove the protesters 
allowed the people to move toward ending the Soviet system. 
 Conversely the Tiananmen Square massacre is one of the most deadly and 
effective displays of a government entity exercising violence to regain power. The 
Tiananmen Square political movement was a set of protests against the corruption of the 
Chinese communist party and supported the desire for having a free and independent 
press. These protests were originally public displays of mourning for  the former 
president of China, Hu Yaobung, a popular reformer who had pushed for both economic 
and social reforms. His liberal reforms had made him popular among the people, but not 
with party hardliners and he was purged from office. After his death, students as well as 
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Chinese from all walks of life began demonstrating against corruption and for more 
reform across the country. The first action of the party was not to officially acknowledge 
the protests. Eventually the party published a statement that the party must struggle 
against disturbances. The party never mentioned the Tiananmen Square protests or 
protests in other cities specifically. After this paper was published, the party attacked the 
protesters with brutal efficacy.  The numbers are very speculative, as the Chinese 
government has released no official numbers, but unofficial estimates of the death toll are 
at over two thousand in Beijing alone, and thought to be much higher especially once the 
other cities are factored in. The Chinese government was able to do this effectively 
because of having total control of the military and effective control to spin the story.  The 
military was able violently to put down the protests and create a widespread fear of 
engaging in mass disobedience. The main contrast here is the success of the Chinese 
government in ending the rebellion, as well as its having enough stability to retain the 
loyalty of the troops. When we apply this to the North Korean context, we need to ask the 
critical question of whether or not the North Korean troops will continue to believe the 
propaganda.  
The state needs  to have the monopoly of violence for several reasons.  The first 
reason is to reinforce the economic and cultural pillars of power by smaller and more 
calculated applications of violence.  The government is able to maintain power and 
stability as a result. "Organized domination, which calls for continuous administration, 
requires that human conduct be conditioned to obedience towards those masters who 
claim to be the bearers of legitimate power. On the other hand, by virtue of this 
obedience, organized domination requires the control of those material goods which in a 
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given case are necessary for the use of physical violence. Thus, organized domination 
requires control of the personal executive staff and the material implements of 
administration." (Weber 1918: 1).  
However, the use of mass violence is perhaps one of the last moves of a state 
desperately attempting to stay in power. It can only succeed if the violence is successful 
in crushing the resistance and instilling fear in the rest of the populace of rising up again. 
This is perhaps the most important pillar of power because it helps to reinforce the 
economic and cultural pillars of power and provides a means to keep government from 
falling. Despite this, if a state needs to resort to mass violence, it is overall a sign of the 
greater instability of the state. 
 “Like the political institutions historically preceding it, the state is a relation of 
men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be 
legitimate) violence. If the state is to exist, the dominated must obey the authority 
claimed by the powers that be" (Weber 1918: 1). What Weber suggests in this quote is 
that a state can survive on the use of violence and force, but ultimately a state cannot 
survive indefinitely if the people do not believe it has the ability to rule them. This 
indicates that having one pillar of power, even that of force is insufficient. Ultimately the 







Chapter 5 - The Current Situation North Korea and Prospects of Reunification 
 The current state of affairs in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
reflects the government’s loss of control over its populace.  The most obvious pillar that 
has been lost is the first pillar of power of economic control over the distribution of 
resources. While political instability does not require a failing economy, a failing 
economy and the inability to provide effective resource distribution to its citizens has had 
a major impact on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the resulting loss of 
control over the lives of its citizens.  
 In the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the result of the loss of economic 
power has had a cascading effect. The lack of resources within the DPRK has led many 
citizens to ignore previous tenets of the government’s controlled economy and therefore 
attempt to make a living on North Korea's burgeoning illicit market. Legally, it is 
forbidden to sell for profit in the DPRK or engage in any type of capitalistic economic 
activity. However, thus far the DPRK government has had to tolerate these markets, as it 
is otherwise unable to provide any kind of basic sustenance for its people.  
This has resulted in a second problem.  Not only does the government no longer 
fully control the distribution of resources, it is also unable to ensure that those resources 
coming across the borders are strictly survival goods such as food, fuel and other 
essentials.  The regime cannot ensure that specialty items such as small transistor radios, 
portable DVD players and even foreign films and TV shows are not entering the country. 
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This represents a serious challenge to the state’s authority and loss of control over the 
second pillar of power which is the control over the flow of information in the country. 
 This has resulted in the government’s reliance on its third pillar of power, the 
state monopoly of violence. Another factor that has to be considered is the ascent of Kim 
Jong-un, who assumed the position of Supreme Leader on December 17, 2011. Kim 
Jong-un was only 29 at the time of his ascent and he faces a serious problem of 
legitimacy, even within the somewhat still rigidly controlled state of the DPRK. By 
examining the four key factors that exist currently within the DPRK it is possible to make 
reasonable inferences with regard to the near future and outlook of the health of the state 
as a whole. The first factor is  the economic collapse of the North Korean state run 
distribution based economy. The second factor is the rise of the illegal markets and the 
black market generation. The third factor is the new availability of foreign media and 
information to the public. The final factor is the growing number of North Koreans 
willing to risk leaving the country. 
 The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was a planned and controlled 
economy until the early 1990s.  The Democratic People's Republic of North Korea 
rationed goods to all citizens in direct proportion to their job. Laborers and especially 
those individuals who worked in highly labor-intensive fields or dangerous fields would 
earn higher rations than a white-collar worker who had a more sedentary job. The 
primary problem with this system was that it relied on the government having control of 
the resources and its ability to distribute enough resources to all workers. "By 1995, 
North Korea's economy was as stone cold dead as the great leader's body. Per capita 
income was plummeting, from $2460 in 1991 to $719 in 1995. North Korea's 
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merchandise exports dropped from $2 billion to about $800 million. The collapse of the 
economy had an organic quality to it, as though the living being were slowly shutting 
down and dying" (Demick 2010: 115). In North Korean cities across the country, 
factories began to shut down.  Fewer freighters came to receive North Korean goods and 
the country's economy began to shut down at all levels. By the mid-1990s, the situation 
had reached a new level of desperation and there were extreme cases of this, as evidenced 
by those who were willing to pick up and eat undigested grains out of the excrement of 
farm animals and eat them.(Demick 2009:134). 
" The fundamental cause behind development of the second economy in North 
Korea, as in the former Soviet Union, was the chronic shortage of consumer goods. The 
second economy in a socialist country is, by definition, excluded from the state-
coordinated distribution channel. It therefore needs to develop its own markets. Second-
economy activities often are illegal in nature, and the markets in which illegal activities 
occur are consequently called black markets. "(Lee, Chun 2001: 213).  People's ingenuity, 
borne of the necessity to use their resources effectively as well as find a means to obtain 
additional resources, would eventually lead to the creation of illicit markets which still 
exist within the DPRK. The government must unofficially tolerate these markets as it is 
no longer able to adequately provide for its people. Its own attempts at creating markets 
and shopping centers sponsored by the state have thus far been unsuccessful. Film 
footage smuggled out of the country and shown in numerous documentaries such as 
2014's  PBS's Frontline: Inside North Korea, show that these government-run department 
stores are more about projecting an image for the country, than a practical means of 
distribution.  There are actually very few goods available for sale. While this shift away 
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from the government controlled planned economy has created problems of legitimacy for 
the DPRK government among its older citizens, it has created an absolute crisis of 
legitimacy amongst the younger citizens who grew up during the famine. 
These young millennials grew up during the height of the famine. In the 
beginning years of the illicit markets and  for the majority of their lives they have never 
known the state’s distribution system. In this way, they have never viewed the state as a 
provider of resources but have had to rely on the illicit markets and their own venture 
capitalism to survive.  
"... younger North Koreans are helping to make grassroots market 
changes a permanent part of the economy. The black markets are too big 
and entrenched for the government to shut down. And as ordinary citizens 
scrape together a living, outside information is stirring intoxicating 
feelings about what's possible. 'The leadership in North Korea knows 
what's going on among its domestic citizens, especially the younger 
generation,' said Jieun Baek, who traveled to North Korea in 2013. As part 
of a closely watched tour group, curious North Koreans asked her about 
America and the outside world. She offered her makeup and bottle of 
Motrin as gifts. 'You can't unlearn citizens’ knowledge of the outside 
world,' said Baek, a fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs at Harvard University." (Wee 2015).  
 
The prevalence of illicit markets in the DPRK, as well as a lessening of the 
famine, has created another situation in North Korea.  There is a new commodity, foreign 
media which is now traded more frequently than one might think. Portable DVD players 
are surprisingly common within the DPRK and most people also have USB drives that 
allow them to play video files from USB storage devices. The USB devices are easier to 
conceal and can also hold more information than a traditional DVD. A mix of 
entrepreneurs, as well as activists working against the regime, have been diligently 
working to smuggle in foreign media and news to North Korea's illicit markets. 
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It must be noted however, that being caught in possession of American or South 
Korean media is still a very serious crime and is punishable by death. As Dr. David 
Kang, the director of the Korean Studies Institute at USC explains in the PBS 
documentary Frontline: the Secret State of North Korea, "Information and knowledge of 
the outside world is beginning to widen out, there's far more inter-penetration of North 
Korean society today than before. If the North Korean people themselves stop believing 
in the regime and the story they tell themselves that means central control is breaking 
down in some way"( Kang 2015). The documentary goes on to note that within the last 
year Kim Jong-un has been sending security forces house to house searching for DVDs 
and USB drives.  There are reports that 80 or more individuals have been executed for 
watching foreign media. It is also believed that, of those who have chosen to leave the 
DPRK, 50% or more of them had watched foreign media. 
" It's my generation often called 'janmadang' for black-market 
generation that will make change permanent. North Korea's black-market 
generation has three main characteristics. The first characteristic of our 
black-market generation is it has no devotion to the Kim Dynasty. I was 
born in 1993, and Kim Il-Sung, the country's founder, he died in 1994. 
And I was brainwashed to glorify him, and his national self-reliant 
economic system. But, I have no actual memory of him. The second 
characteristic of our black-market generation is it has had wide access to 
outside media and information. The private market provided us with more 
than food and clothing. It provided us DVDs with movies like Titanic and 
USBs with Wikipedia. The third characteristic of our black-market 
generation is we are capitalistic and individualistic. We grew up with 
markets. We experienced selling and buying... Once you start training for 
yourself, you start thinking for yourself, and that's a big threat to the Kim 
regime."( (Park: Oslo Freedom Forum 2014).  
The black-market generation is perhaps the greatest threat to the current Kim 
Dynasty, and the greatest driving force for lasting change in the system of government in 
North Korea. This access to information as well as a willingness to enter into business to 
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gain their own resources has led many of the black market generation and older 
generations to make an incredible leap of faith and flee North Korea in hopes of finding a 
better life. 
 The government's inability to provide for its own people has completely 
undermined the distribution based, controlled economy which North Korea relies on or 
had previously relied on. This is creating a staggering refugee crisis, "The current social 
and economic crisis in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea  has resulted in an 
explosive increase in the illegal migration of North Koreans to Northeast China. The 
stream of North Korean refugees are a new phenomenon, but its extent has become one 
of the factors exercising considerable influence on the situation in the region." (Lankov 
2004: 856). The International Rescue Committee estimates that between 30,000 and 
60,000 North Korean refugees are currently hiding within the People's Republic of China.  
Very few of these individuals will ever make it to the Republic of Korea. Some reports 
have placed this estimate much higher. "The refugees, estimated at around 100,000, are 
caught in a complex web of hidden agendas pursued by all sides involved in the crisis ..." 
(Lankov 2004: 856).    
The current refugee crisis is compounded by several factors.  The most obvious 
route for North Korean defectors would indicate they should go south and simply cross 
the border to the Republic of Korea.  However the significant size of the Korean People's 
Liberation Army at the border, as well as the 2 mile wide demilitarized zone, make 
crossing into the Republic of Korea from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
nearly impossible. The demilitarized zone which separates the two countries is well 
known for being the most heavily mined place on earth estimated to have over  2 million 
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mines in the ground. Over the years, fewer than 10 people have managed to cross into the 
Republic of Korea by this route. For most individuals the only option is to cross into the 
People's Republic of China. Currently North Korean refugees in the People's Republic of 
China hold no legal refugee status.  They are considered illegal migrants and repatriated 
back to the DPRK if they are caught. This is in spite of the fact that China is a signatory 
to the United Nations convention on refugees. As previously discussed in reference to the 
third pillar of power, the government of the DPRK is willing to utilize harsh 
punishments, even capital punishment on those who leave the DPRK. While a certain 
amount of smuggling seems to be tolerated, attempting to escape from the country is a 
very serious act. So harsh are the punishments that many who leave are willing to go to 
extreme lengths to make sure that they are not captured "armed with knives, we were 
ready to kill ourselves, if we were going to be sent back to North Korea." (Park: Oslo 
Freedom Forum 2014). 
 China's current refusal to recognize North Korean refugees is based on several 
factors. First and foremost, the People's Republic of China has for years used the DPRK 
as a buffer state between it and the capitalist and now democratic Republic of Korea. As 
is so often the case for refugees around the world, many North Korean refugees who are 
simply motivated by a need for survival find themselves in the midst of a three-way 
political tug-of-war for regional influence. "Internationally, the refugees constitute a 
considerable nuisance to the authorities of at least three countries. Sadly, in fact, the 
refugees, whose only goal is survival (or, perhaps, a slight improvement in their lot) have 
become victims of the real or perceived political interests of Beijing, Pyongyang, and 
Seoul. " (Lankov 2004: 872). 
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 For the People's Republic of China, maintaining a buffer state between China and 
the Republic of Korea is of some benefit.  There is however the larger problem which is 
what should happen if the DPRK were to collapse. "The Chinese authorities are not 
happy about the presence of many illegal immigrants in their country. Apart from the 
economic and social problems refugees cause (or may cause) in the cities of Northeast 
China, their presence creates a number of diplomatic problems and adversely influences 
relations between China and the two Koreas. China also worries about the stability of 
North Korea, which serves as a strategically important buffer between the Chinese 
Northeast and the U.S. forces in South Korea." (Lankov 2004: 872). The collapse of the 
DPRK would undoubtedly create an even larger refugee problem, and put further strain 
on Northeastern China's economy, although this would largely dependent on how the 
regime collapsed and what occured afterward.  
China's refusal to recognize North Korean refugees in any legal capacity has made 
these refugees incredibly vulnerable.  Many North Korean women face possible 
exploitation, either as forced brides or in the sex industry. North Korean refugees can also 
face exploitation as laborers and live in constant fear of deportation. "There are now 
13,000 North Korean refugees living in the South, four times as many as just four years 
ago... These are the lucky few, the ones who've made it and survived the last great escape 
from communism"(BBC - This World - Escaping North Korea).  The greatest hurdle to 
refugees making it all the way to  the Republic of Korea is a refusal by the Chinese 
government to treat these refugees as refugees.  The process of rejection has gone so far 
as posting guards around the Republic of Korea's embassies and consulates to keep 
people from defecting. 
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 The current state of affairs in the DPRK indicates a high degree of political and 
social instability. The death of North Korea's previous leader, Kim Jong-il and the 
subsequent transfer of power to his son Kim Jong-un represents a critical moment in the 
history of the DPRK. When North Korea's former leader, Kim Il-sung, chose Kim Jong-il 
as his successor, this was seen as an unexpected move within the upper echelon of the 
Korean Workers Party.   Kim Jong-il was not perceived as intellectual, charismatic, or as 
exhibiting qualities of leadership. However, once Kim Il-sung had selected Kim Jong-il 
as his successor, the country's small army of propagandists went to work creating a godly 
mythos around Kim Jong-il.  
While Kim Jong-il may not have been the most practical choice, the fact that Kim 
il-Sung had the sense to select an heir well ahead of his death meant that the North 
Korean propagandists had nearly 20 years to build a mythos around Kim Jong-il. While 
members of the Kim family and upper levels of the government would not be swayed by 
these propaganda films, the masses could be.  
Kim Jong-un faces two significant disadvantages in his succession. The first and 
foremost is his age.   Kim Jong-un is only 32 years of age at the time of this writing.  His 
age creates a major issue in a country which has a strong Confucian past. Despite the 
state's official ideology of Juche, traditional Korean ideals, such as Confucianism and 
respect for elders, factor heavily into this philosophy. At only 32 years of age, and only 
29 years of age when Kim Jong-un took power, he is significantly younger than his father 
was when he first took control from Kim Il-sung. An additional problem that Kim Jong-
un faces is the short amount of time during which he was named as his father's eventual 
67 
 
successor. While his father Kim Jong-il had had the better part of 20 years to have his 
mythos established, Kim Jong-un had less than a year. 
 Former CIA analyst, North Korean expert and research scholar at Columbia 
University, Sue Mi Terry states, "In North Korea there is reverence for age and 
experience, these things matter. And now you're sort of parading around this 29-year-old 
who has never served a day in the military. I doubt that people genuinely have the same 
kinds of feelings towards Kim Jong-un as they did for Kim Jong-il" (Frontline: The 
Secret State of North Korea). Video footage from inside the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea presents numerous scenes of average citizens, as well as members of 
the elite, in the capital of Pyongyang expressing displeasure and frustration with the 
regime.  
The idea of reunification of the two Koreas has been a consistent topic for both 
nations, since the two were split by the Allies at the end of World War II. The greatest 
hurdle to reunification is dependent on what form reunification would take and what role 
each government would play in a new, unified Korean state. The Republic of Korea 
generally tends to favor an East German reunification model.  
One of the initial issues that led to East Germany's willingness to rapidly open up 
and reunify with West Germany was the rapid depopulation that occurred out of East 
Germany. East Germany bordered several countries both communist and capitalist. The 
North Korean situation is different due to both reasons of politics and geography. As 
previously stated, there are only two practical countries that North Koreans can directly 
escape to: the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation. The Russian 
Federation only shares a small border with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.  
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Therefore North Korean citizen’s only country to escape to is the People's Republic of 
China, as the DPRK's border with the Republic of Korea is the most heavily militarized 
zone in the world. 
 Current models dealing with reunification tend to focus purely on the economic 
side of a reunified Korea. This can be contrasted to the economic disparity that existed 
between West Germany and East Germany, with the East German state economically 
behind West Germany. Indeed the economic aspects of a possible reunification cannot be 
ignored, as much of North Korea's infrastructure has either been destroyed through 
scavenging or disuse, or would require significant upgrades. This would place a high 
financial burden on any reunified government.  
"With regard to a desirable political system after unification (NUB 
1976, 1988, December 1989b; MoI June 1990, August 1990; KISD 1991), 
over the last 20 years most South Koreans preferred a liberal democratic 
system, although it is interesting to find that lower percentages of citizens 
chose this option when the survey used the term "South Korean system" or 
"capitalist system": instead of liberal democratic system as in the 1988 and 
1990 surveys. By contrast, using "North Korean system" instead of 
socialist or communist system did not make a difference, but this option 
was chosen by less than 2 percent. Surprisingly, however, there has been a 
significant increase over time in support for a mixed system (although the 
term "mixed" was left undefined)."(Chung, Nagel 1992: 856-857).  
One of the major problems that any Korean unification will face is the likely 
unwillingness of the Kims to relinquish power. An additional point of contention is the 
difference between the East German government and the government of North Korea. 
While the East German government was by no means a democratically elected body, it 
was a body of politicians who made no claims to divinity. The East German government 
utilized similar tools of oppression as the DPRK, but it did not utilize a work camp 
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system or a three generation punishment system. These factors will likely prevent any 
kind of peaceful reunification so long as the current Kim regime remains in power. 
 The current situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is one that is 
constantly evolving. The state has all but lost any semblance of control over the 
economy. The state's attempts to introduce a more controlled economy to this point have 
been unsuccessful as the illicit markets that developed during the North Korean famine 
and economic collapse persist to this day. The nation’s millennial generation, the 20 and 
30-year-olds of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have little, if any allegiance 
to the regime directly and have grown up working and surviving in an illicit underground 
capitalist marketplace. 
 On a daily basis, the regime is losing more of its control over the information 
North Korean citizens have from the outside world, as well as the perception they have of 
their own lives and how the regime provides for them. This is a cultural change that 
represents perhaps the most grave challenge to the regime's authority and has been 
responded to with the last stable pillar of power, that of force and violence. 
 While the regime is seemingly in a tenuous position and in danger of undergoing 
a serious shift in the balance of power, it still has its army and security apparatus to 
maintain power. As revealed in footage from the Frontline documentary, while even 
members of the elite in the capital of Pyongyang are dissatisfied with their lack of rights 
and abilities within the current system, no one thinks of active direct resistance, firmly 
believing that anyone who resists the regime will be killed. It is very unlikely that 
unification will occur if the Kim family remains in power. The current basis for 
legitimacy in the North Korean state revolves around the Kim family. The harsh reality of 
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the current situation in North Korea is best summed up by author and North Korea expert 
Andre Lankrov: "If a government is willing to kill as many people as necessary to stay in 
power, it usually stays in power for a very long time. There are many people who are not 
happy, there are many people who in the privacy of their bedrooms sometimes say 
something very, very subversive to their wives and most trusted friends. But no networks 



















 The state level society is currently the largest power structure that exists within 
human society. State level societies rule and control the destinies and fates of millions, 
and billions, of human beings. For this reason it is imperative for us to understand the 
ways in which states practically derive their power. In the anthropological sense the 
ability of the state to influence power over its people can be divided into three types of 
power, which I have referred to as pillars. Each of these pillars is independent of the 
others and it is possible for two to exist where the other does not. What this thesis has 
labored to prove is that losing one of these pillars of power creates instability in the state, 
losing two of these pillars only heightens the instability, and should the state lose all three 
pillars of power then it will cease to exist. 
 The first of the pillars of power is control of the economic system and/or 
influence over the economic system, as well as control or influence over resource 
distribution. Cultural materialism has shown us that the priorities of society can be 
inferred from what resources and commodities are given the greatest attention. Within the 
example of the DPRK we saw how the controlled economic system was utilized by the 
government to control both the infrastructural and structural components of the economy. 
When the government was no longer able to provide that service people were forced to 
adapt to the new situation and the power over the infrastructural and structural elements 
became more distributed amongst the people through the new market based system. A 
group of people who previously had had little to no experience with any kind of free-
market economic exchange were able to rapidly change from the distribution based 
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controlled economy into one where they were forced to do business for profit in order to 
survive. Much of North Korea's previous system and economy had been held up because 
the state had been able to successfully distribute needed resources to its people. Once 
those needs were no longer met people began to seek other methods to acquire the needed 
resources to survive. 
 The second pillar of power that was examined was the state's control or influence 
over of culture and the flow of information. Within the DPRK the government's complete 
and total control over all internal and external communication and the flow of 
information has been one of its most critical and important pillars of power. By limiting 
information and contact from the outside world the regime was able to create a political 
arena in which it had incredible advantage over any would be challenger.  When 
examining the state's control of the flow of information as well as over the North Korean 
culture it was important to understand the context of Korean history. Certain historical 
periods such as the role played by the city of Pyongyang in the Three Kingdoms period, 
as well as the mythological importance of Mount Pektu, are of key importance in 
understanding the regime's propaganda as well as how the regime constructed the cult of 
Kim Il-sung. It is additionally important for this particular pillar to understand the 
concept of game theory. Understanding the normative rules as well as the pragmatic rules 
of politics in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is critical for understanding how 
the regime proceeded to exercise its control over information and culture to create a more 
compliant and loyal population. In particular one needs to understand the concept of 
Juche within the context of using Juche's tenets to create a moral team. The entire Korean 
system of information and cultural control is designed to create a moral team to maintain 
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control over the populace rather than a contract team which would be less loyal. This is 
also used to build up the cult of personality surrounding the Kims and to cement the 
people behind them into a moral team. 
Additionally this practice of controlling and limiting the amount of outside information 
that is able to enter the country has helped the regime to create a political arena that 
creates a strong advantage for the Kim Family regime and marginalizes any potential 
political opponents. Control of information also allows the regime free reign in 
portraying the Kims as successful political men and, to an extent, economic men.  
 The third pillar of power in the state level society is the government's monopoly 
on the use of violence and force. This is based on Max Weber's assertion in his now 
famous speech "politics as a vocation". In the speech Weber asserts that the state not only 
has the ability to marshal large amounts of violent force but also has the ability to 
legitimize force. Elements such as legal systems and punishment are examples of the 
state monopoly on force and violence. With regard to the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea this is of particular importance as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
not only utilizes a massive military and secret police force to enforce its will but also 
utilizes a system of prison camps as well as its now infamous system of three generations 
punishment, which is not practiced in any other state level society. Given the current 
situation within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, especially with regard to the 
rise of the black markets and the increasing attempts of ordinary North Korean citizens to 
escape North Korea for China, this particular pillar of power has become even more 
important for the regime. 
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 This combination of the direct control over the infrastructure and structure that 
makes up the economy pillar of power uses gift reciprocity and patronage to invest 
citizens in the system and make them morally indebted to the system. In addition to 
economic controls, by limiting and shaping the political arena through limiting and 
controlling information, the regime is able to build up the credentials and mythos of the 
Kim family as a political and economic men, even making them seem to have divine 
ability. Finally using the monopoly of force to enforce strict legal codes that keep 
deviants in line. The regime's goal is to keep the political arena favoring the regime and 
providing a support for the other two pillars of power. These paradigms in combination 
make up the proposed three pillars of state power within the DPRK. When the state 
controls these factors its ability to the control the population is almost complete. However 
when the state loses control of just one of these pillars of power then it becomes unsteady 
and vulnerable. 
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is at a critical tipping point in its 
history. It has an economy that has utterly failed for many years.  It was under a famine 
that may have wiped out as much as 10% of its population and left an entire generation 
stunted. The famine period in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or the Arduous 
March, as it is now known, left what might be an irrevocable scar upon the nation’s 
psyche regardless of the careful propaganda that the state has attempted to weave using 
Korean history and culture to help create its ideal society. The death of Kim Il-sung, just 
before the start of the Arduous March may have preserved his legacy and reputation in 
the eyes of the people. The virtual economic collapse that happened during the Arduous 
March exposed people, or rather forced people, to engage in a makeshift capitalistic 
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barter market in order to survive. This created a black market that not only provided food 
and other essential items for sale but also smuggled in goods from China and South 
Korea. Everything from TVs and DVD players to South Korean movies and pop music 
were brought into the culture. The very act of turning on a television or radio to a foreign 
station to  loading a thumb drive with foreign movies is a very bold display of active 
resistance as described by Scott. Perhaps more important, is the number of North Koreans 
who every year attempt the dangerous crossing over the Yalu and Tumen rivers into 
China.  Before the Arduous March that number was under a thousand for the whole 
period of rule by Kim Il-sung. During and after the Arduous March, the number of North 
Koreans crossing into China swelled into the hundreds of thousands. Although the 
situation has improved slightly in North Korea, the economy is still in shambles and 
hunger and homelessness are still common. More importantly, the regime's once iron 
fisted control over communication and information, as well as manipulation of the 
culture, is starting to weaken. The regime of the young Kim Jong-un is left with only one 
truly reliable tool for maintaining control of its people, the monopoly of violence. 
 Currently the Democratic People's Republic of Korea faces its greatest challenge 
to authority from the new so-called "black-market generation". This refers to a generation 
of people, mostly the millennial generation that has grown up without any experience of 
the regime, being able to directly distribute resources. These people grew up having to 
survive conducting business in the country's burgeoning black market. As such they have 
grown up under a capitalist market place, and have very little direct loyalty to the regime 
other than the propaganda that was forced upon them. One of the major differences 
however is that this propaganda had to compete with increasing amounts of foreign 
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media as well as "footpath news", a system of word of mouth where news is passed from 
person to person and town to town, and accounts of the world outside the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea. This combination of a lack of economic control as well as 
competing foreign media and information presents a greater threat to the stability of the 
current regime's hold on power than any previous external threat since the end of the 
Korean War. With this challenge to its first two pillars of state power the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea is left only with the third as a stable basis of power, the 
monopoly on violence and force.   
 While North Korea has never been afraid to use violence and force to control its 
people, it has always done so only when a well-constructed and effective propaganda net 
and cultural indoctrination regime have failed to ensnare a relatively small number of 
people. There has been a strong reliance on the North Korean government being able 
virtually to control and/or keep out all outside cultural influence.  That appears to no 
longer be possible. While one would not be so bold or hopeful to say that the collapse of 
the regime is imminent, one could say that the DPRK is in a critical stage and that the 
government is very vulnerable to collapse. This is especially relevant given the recent 
news out of North Korea that Kim Jong-un has dismissed his Uncle from the 2nd most 
powerful position in the country and publicly executed two of his Uncle’s supporters. 
North Korea is an interesting case amongst nations.  It reveals how a state can manipulate 
culture and history to create an incredibly compliant and loyal citizenry.  It also 
demonstrates how the larger, direct control exerted by a state over its population creates 
an environment that is more susceptible to failure during periods of hardship. When one 
pillar of the state power fails, it can still maintain control, but if two pillars fail, the state 
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itself is in danger of failing with it. 
 Attempting to predict the downfall of an entire political regime is almost always 
an exercise in futility.  Many of the most important geopolitical events of the 20th 
century were not predicted, examples including the fall of Soviet Union. While these 
events could not have been predicted, the potential for something to happen certainly 
could be seen by any educated observer. The current situation in Korea is certainly a 
tenuous one with the rise of the black-market generation. People are increasing willing to 
resort to forms of everyday “peasant” resistance against the regime and the regime's is 
increasingly unable to control the flow of information within the country. Given these 
developments, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's government finds itself in a 
very tenuous position. As stated earlier one can imagine the three pillars of power as legs 
of a stool, the more legs that are removed, the more unstable the regime becomes, and if 
all are removed then the whole government can fall apart. While the government still has 
a firm grasp on the military, as far as we know, the current situation and people's 
increasing frustration and willingness to combat the regime on certain issues shows that 
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